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Abstract 
 
The core question this study aims to address is whether a state-sponsored ethnic 
middle class in a dominant party political system premised on ethnic politics, will 
punish the ruling party by not according them their electoral vote. The latter core 
question stems from the conventional notion of a large middle class producing 
stronger democratic tendencies within a society. However, South Africa and 
Malaysia are dominant political party systems where politics is aligned along 
ethnic lines fundamentally because of the colonial and apartheid histories.  
Furthermore, the ethnic middle classes’ (Malays and Blacks) grew as a result of 
affirmative action policies implemented by the same political parties that 
dominated the political scene in the respective countries. 
An analytical framework of one-party dominance, ethnic politics and the 
composition of the state bureaucracy, is applied to analysing the Black and 
Malay middle classes’ behaviour in South Africa and Malaysia. This study looks 
at how the Black and Malay middle classes’ grew via state affirmative action 
policies implemented in public service employment, business and education; 
which are fundamental spheres for social upward mobility. This was done by 
looking at the implementation of the NEP in Malaysia between 1971 to 1990, and 
the implementation of BEE and employment equity in South Africa post-1994. 
South Africa and Malaysia’s colonial and apartheid histories created 
economic imbalances amongst majority and minority ethnicities primarily. 
Therefore, after independence and the inauguration of democracy the 
assumption of political power of ethnic majorities resulted in a need for the past’s 
economic imbalances to be addressed. Hence, affirmative action policies were 
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implemented that would benefit the ethnic majority groupings (Malays and Blacks) 
where the electorate is highly polarised. Therefore, the outcome of this study 
suggests that because politics are aligned along ethnic lines under a climate 
where the ANC and the UMNO have political hegemony, the Malay and Black 
middle classes’ are unlikely to bite the hand that feeds it. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die kernvraag in hierdie studie wentel om die moontlikheid al dan nié dat ‘n staat-
ondersteunde  etniese middelklas in ‘n dominante-party politieke opset  wat op 
etniese grondslag gebaseer is, die regerende party sal straf deur hul verkiesingstem 
te weerhou.  Dit spreek die konvensionele siening aan dat ‘n groot middelklas 
demokratiese tendense in ‘n gemeenskap sal versterk.  Nietemin, bestaan 
dominante-party stelsels in Suid-Afrika en Maleisië ooreenkomstig basies  etniese 
riglyne as  gevolg van hul onderskeie apartheid en koloniale geskiedenisse.  Meer 
nog: die etniese middelklasse het hul bestaan te danke aan die regstellende aksie 
beleide wat ingestel is deur dieselfde politieke partye wat die politiek in die 
onderskeie lande domineer. 
Swart en Maleier middelklas-gedrag in Suid-Afrika en Maleisië is ge-analiseer 
volgens ‘n raamwerk van een-party oorheersing en die samestelling van die 
staatburokrasie. Hierdie studie fokus op  die wyse waarop die Swart en Maleisiese 
middelklas deur middel van regstellende aksie in openbare dienste, besigheid en 
opvoeding – die fundamentele sektore vir die ontwikkeling van opwaartse mobiliteit 
in die samelewing – bevoordeel is. Dit is gedoen deur te kyk na die 
beleidstoepassing van die NEP in Maleisië tussen 1971 en 1990 en die toepassing 
van Swart Ekonomiese Bemagtiging (BEE) en gelyke werkgeleenthede  in Suid-
Afrika sedert 1994. 
Die grootste ekonomiese wanbalans tussen meerderheid- en 
minderheidsgroepe is hoofsaaklik die gevolg van Maleisië en Suid-Afrika se 
onderskeidelike geskiedenisse van koloniale en apartheidsregering. Onafhanklikheid 
en die instelling van ‘n demokratiese stelsel het dus aandag aan die ekonomiese 
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wanbalans genoodsaak.  Vanselfsprekend sou die regstellende aksie ter voordeel 
van die meerderheids- en etniese groepe (Maleiers en Swart mense), waar die 
elektoraat uiters gepolariseer is, werk. Die uitkoms van hierdie studie dui daarop dat 
weens die klimaat geskep deur die politieke hegemonie van die ANC en die UMNO, 
waar die politiek volgens etniese riglyne bedryf word, dit onwaarskylik is dat die 
Maleisiese en Swart middelklasse bevoordeling van die hand sal wys. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Ever since the time of Aristotle and Seymour Martin Lipset, conventional wisdom 
within the discipline of politics has been that a large and robust middle class is an 
essential element in ensuring stable democracy. Modernisation theory posits the 
idea of economic modernity or prosperity begetting democracy, which then translates 
in simple terms to: No middle class, no democracy (The Economist, 2013:56). 
However, modernisation and democratisation theorists are faced with a plethora of 
cases where the middle class in different contexts and settings yields different 
outcomes. Much of this range in the democratic impact of the middle class within 
different settings can be attributed to the fact that the middle class itself is an 
ambiguous concept. The middle class is both an empirical reality as well as an 
ideological construct in how it is measured, as well as how it is viewed by society. 
However, as the middle class in respective settings grows through economic 
modernisation, conventional wisdom assumes that expectations of government 
performance increase, as well as expected connected issues of good governance, 
free speech, ending corruption and fair/free elections. Furthermore, members of the 
middle class also have better resources, better skills and the time to protest against 
unjust practices, compared to the working and lower classes. 
Nevertheless, it was the middle class that rallied behind and supported 
Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973. In China, too, despite the overwhelming size and 
strength of its middle class, there has been no call for democratic reform of China’s 
autocratic regime.  High growth in Russia, which chiefly benefits the middle class, 
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could be an indication that this leads to increased support for its autocratic 
government. Russia is not only more affluent, but also more autocratic. The 
aforementioned cases are but a few examples of the middle class not conforming to 
its democratic role as suggested by the modernisation theory. These different cases 
illustrate that protesting against autocracy and advocating for better democratic 
governance, is not monopolised by the middle class (The Economist, 2013:56). 
Therefore, due to the ambiguous role the middle class plays, it is necessary to 
understand the context in which it operates. When the middle classes’ democratic 
role is analysed keeping in mind the context and the factors that led to middle class 
growth, the unpredictable nature of how it plays out, can be better understood in 
terms of inferences and small generalisations. This thesis analyses the extent to 
which middle classes in dominant political party systems that are driven by ethnic 
politics, are more likely to entrench the ruling party which sponsored the emerging 
‘new’ middle class. 
1.2 Rationale of the study 
 
The middle class in developing countries is widely accepted as being the most pro-
democratic stratum in society. However, the conventional assumption of a large 
middle class producing stronger democratic tendencies has come under some 
contestation. This is due to the fact that different democratic settings or contexts 
produce middle classes that behave differently. Modernisation theory posits a 
unilinear causal relationship between economic modernisation and the 
democratisation process. For example, socioeconomic modernisation leads to the 
growth and rise of the middle class, which in turn becomes the driving force of 
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democratisation in non-democratic settings, or strengthens democratic institutions in 
democratic regimes (Chen & Lu, 2011:706). This phenomenon in some cases is true 
like Brazil, India and Turkey where protests in the streets rallied majority middle 
class crowds protesting against corruption and better public service delivery (The 
Economist, 2013:56). However, the causal relationship between economic 
modernisation and democratisation cannot be ratified under dominant party political 
regimes driven by ethnic politics, like in Malaysia and South Africa. Modernisation 
theory has many shortcomings when applied to contexts like these, because factors 
like a country’s colonial history and factors pertaining to the manner in which the 
middle class grew, are not taken into consideration. Therefore, in order to highlight 
the unpredictable impact of the middle class on democracy, this study will use two 
cases where the middle class has grown substantially but the quality of democracy 
has not matched that growth. 
Malaysia and South Africa share many similarities: both countries were 
colonised by the British, both countries have vastly heterogeneous populations in 
terms of ethnicity, and both Malaysia and South Africa have been ruled by dominant 
parties since they became democracies. Furthermore, both ethnic middle classes in 
the respective countries were state-sponsored via the implementation of affirmative 
action state policies. The use of these two cases is useful because given the vast 
similarities and differences between the societies; one could uncover and draw 
parallels on the pattern of behaviour of the two middle classes to surmise certain 
generalizations.  
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1.3 Problem statement 
 
The rationale for this thesis centres on a derived research problem which 
encapsulates a niche in the study of the middle class. This study argues that the 
Black middle class in South Africa is less prone to rejecting the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC) by voting because of its dominant political party system, 
ethnic politics, and the loyalty of the bureaucracy to the ruling party. Furthermore, in 
order to demonstrate this, the South African Black middle class case will be 
compared to the manner in which the state-sponsored Malay middle class has 
ensured the dominance of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) since 
independence. The UMNO is the dominant party in the ruling coalition, and its 
dominance has much to do with politics being aligned along ethnic lines in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, this study will examine Malaysia’s affirmative action policy known as 
the National Economic Plan (NEP), which was implemented in education, business 
and public sector employment (bureaucracy) in order to analyse similarities and 
differences between the two cases. The same will be done in South Africa’s case 
where the ANC implemented affirmative action policies (under the ideology of the 
National Democratic Revolution [NDR]) in business, public sector employment and 
education. 
Accordingly the research question guiding this study is: Do ethnically driven 
one-party dominant systems prompt a state-sponsored middle class to support the 
ruling party? 
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1.4 Conceptualisation 
 
This study focuses on the role the middle class is supposed to play within a 
democratic system; however, as mentioned earlier, scholars have contested the 
meaning of being middle class. Therefore, this section of the thesis will illustrate the 
different approaches researchers have implemented in the study of the middle class. 
After these various approaches have been fleshed out, the conceptualisation of the 
middle class used in this study will be put forth because this concept is fundamental 
to understanding the argument of this thesis. 
1.4.1 Middle Class 
 
There are many approaches to studying and defining the middle class within the 
discipline of international economics literature; for instance a relative definition of the 
middle class as a class belonging to the middle income distribution throughout the 
population (middle-income strata), or on the other hand an absolute definition of the 
middle class premised on the level of affluence or lifestyle of these members. This 
absolute definition refers to the purchasing power of the middle class, or viewing the 
middle class with reference to their consumer behaviour (Kharas, 2010:11). These 
two definitions are derived from developed countries where those who occupy the 
middle strata of the income distribution, are more likely to be affluent in absolute 
terms. However, these separate definitions have revealed two very different ‘middle 
classes’ in terms of the classes’ composition as well as economic profile, especially 
when applied in South Africa. This is a fundamental flaw within the literature, 
because given South Africa’s extensive poverty and massive income inequality 
throughout the country; it has ramifications for policies which seek to promote the 
growth and status of the middle class.  
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Rubinson and Quilan (1977:622) stipulate that there is a relationship between 
socio-economic inequality and class analysis, because the middle class is generally 
regarded as the strongest pro-democratic social stratum in society. (Rivero et al, 
2003:6). Therefore, one can infer that the size of the middle class in a given country 
is indicative of the existing level of inequality in society. However, the context within 
which this middle class must grow is embedded in a   globalised capitalist system 
which imposes certain constraints. For instance, Muller (1995) found that economic 
development did not produce democracy in the sixties and seventies, because of 
income inequality (Rivero et al, 2003:9). The process of capitalist economic 
development is expected to confer a positive effect on democratisation, but this 
process heightens income inequality initially. This then is expected to have a 
negative effect on democratisation due to the fact that a high level of income 
inequality radicalises the proletariat, fuels class polarisation and reduces the 
tolerance of the middle class for political participation of the lower classes (Rivero et 
al, 2003:9). The point that Muller makes is that income inequality amongst the 
populace is incompatible with a stable democracy. This latter point is fundamental to 
this study of the middle class, because the process whereby the state will reduce 
those inequalities within the polity (via ethnic affirmative action policies) will indicate 
whether the middle class will support the ruling party. Hence, given the accepted 
global notion that the growth of the middle class will affect democracy positively, this 
study will seek to investigate how the respective ethnic middle classes in Malaysia 
and South Africa have impacted on democracy, and whether this class will 
strengthen the hegemony of the dominant party.  
Rivero et al (2003) employ a different approach in their analysis of social 
structure in South Africa. The two approaches the scholars refer to are the Marxist 
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and Weberian methods of class analysis. The Marxist method is premised on class 
conflict and class consciousness among the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or in 
other words, the conflict between those who own and/or control the means of 
production versus those who do not (Rivero et al, 2003:10). Weber’s approach can 
be termed structural-functionalist where class is regarded “as an individually 
decomposable group of people with the similar characteristics of income, occupation, 
education and so forth” (Rivero et al, 2003:10). Both Marx and Weber analysed the 
middle class by distinguishing between the old middle class and the new middle 
classes. The old middle class are the propertied middle class who own and work the 
means of production, compared to the new middle class who are non-propertied 
white-collar employees. Furthermore, the latter are typically employed in government 
or in the corporate world, and share classic characteristics with the proletariat in 
terms of being in a subordinate relationship to capital-owning employers (Rivero et al, 
2003:10). However, these salaried employees could generally earn a higher income 
than members of the old middle class, who are typically the owners of middle to 
small-scale capitalist enterprises. 
On the other hand, scholars like Carlsson (1958), Wright (1979) and 
Goldthorpe (1987) who undertook previous research on social structure, warn about 
decisions that a researcher must make when analysing social structure. The first is 
the degree of coverage based on the difference between an entire population and 
those who are economically active. The second concern regards the unit of analysis 
referring to the individual person or institution (individual or family) (Rivero et al, 
2003:11).  
For the purposes of this study, the middle class will be conceptualised as a 
social class that draws its primary income from non-manual employment (white-
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collar employees) as managers, self-employed business entrepreneurs, civil 
servants (bureaucrats) and professionals like teachers, doctors, lawyers and nurses. 
Hence, the unit of analysis is the individual based on their occupation. In studies of 
middle class, the choice of which approach to implement is dependent on the 
purpose at hand. This conceptualisation of the middle class as ‘white-collar 
employees’ employed by the state or in the private sector, is fundamental to 
understanding how this middle class will behave. The latter point takes into account 
the fact that both Malaysia and South Africa have an ethnically state-sponsored 
middle class developed via preferential state policies implemented in business, 
education and in public sector employment. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of 
the middle class in this study will refer to the new middle class as suggested by Marx 
and Weber, where the fundamental focus will be on the new Malay middle class and 
the new Black middle class respectively. The reason for this conceptualisation is that 
these new ethnic middle classes are the ones impacted on by state-sanctioned 
affirmative action policies. The conceptualisation of the middle class and its role in 
modernisation theory forms the basis of the analytical framework of this thesis, which 
is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
The following section of this chapter will move on to conceptualising ‘support 
for democracy’, as this is the suspected impact of the middle class, according to 
conventional wisdom. 
1.4.2 Support for Democracy 
 
Support for democracy is a multidimensional phenomenon that needs to be 
understood in terms of the intrinsic and instrumental support components. David 
Easton, who is one of the leading scholars in the field of democratic support, 
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distinguished between three different levels of systems support (Easton, 1965:201). 
These respective categorisations coined by Easton were distinguished from one 
another in terms of support for the community, support for the regime, and lastly the 
support for the authorities or people in power in the democratic system1. According 
to Easton, the support for the community referred to the feelings represented 
amongst the populace in terms of their identity as a nation-state, whereas the 
support for the regime included the evaluation of many of the fundamental political 
institutions within a democratic system like the legislature/parliament, executive and 
the respective courts that upheld the rule of law and guaranteed human rights and 
civil liberties (Easton, 1965:201). Lastly, support for the authorities required 
evaluating the political leaders in power and their political parties. These distinctions 
determined  by Easton provide an essential aid in terms of understanding the various 
dimensions of democratic support, as well as indicating how ‘output failure’ can bring 
the legitimacy of a regime into disrepute (Easton, 1965:201)  
Pippa Norris has furthered the work of David Easton by developing a 
conceptual framework that builds on Easton’s initial framework (Norris, 2006:3). 
Norris adopts a five-fold framework which expands the Eastonian concept by 
distinguishing between support for the political community, government performance, 
principles and institutions, and the respective political actors operating within the 
regime (Norris, 2006:4). In terms of briefly outlining the different categories, the 
distinctions that Norris articulates can be seen to range on a continuum from   the 
most diffuse support for the political community as a nation-state, to more specific 
                                                          
1
 Similar trends are of course also detectable in relation to White Afrikaners support for the NP. However, 
South Africa was not in that case a full democracy and the apartheid state is beyond the limited scope of this 
study. 
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support as to how the government or politicians perform in delivering tasks like basic 
services to the populace. 
  This study is interested in whether the new ethnic middle classes in Malaysia 
and South Africa will ‘punish’ (by voting them out) the dominant political parties in 
power in  their democracies, middle class support for democracy is conceptualised 
using Norris’ formulation to support of government institutions, as outlined in her 
framework. Support for regime institutions refers to the public’s trust and confidence 
in “[governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system, political parties, and 
state bureaucracy]” for example. In addition, Norris’ support for regime institutions 
also includes the trust and confidence in trade unions, the media and business as 
private institutions (Norris, 2006:7). Therefore, this study is only interested in the 
respective middle classes’ support for political parties because both cases (Malaysia 
and South Africa) present dominant party systems premised on ethnic politics. 
Furthermore, it makes more sense to evaluate the middle classes’ support for 
dominant political parties, because these political parties control state machinery and 
have implemented ethnic affirmative action policies that impact on or benefit the 
middle class the most. These state-implemented affirmative action policies 
(discussed in-depth in Chapter 3 and 4) are the fundamental reason for the growth of 
ethnic middle classes in Malaysia and South Africa, since these ethnicities were 
historically marginalised under colonialism and apartheid. The following section will 
conceptualise dominant political party systems and ethnic politics for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
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1.4.3 Dominant Political Party Systems and Ethnic Politics 
 
According to De Jager (2009), dominant party systems refer to systems where 
“procedurally democratic regimes are dominated by one specific political party for 
prolonged periods.” Therefore, these democratic regimes satisfy procedural 
preconditions for a democratic system, in that opposition parties are allowed to 
participate freely and fairly in regular elections (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013:3). A 
dominant party system is very different to a one-party system, because in a one-
party system there is only one political party that has the legal right or grounds to 
participate in politics, as well as acting undemocratically (De Jager & Du toit, 2013: 
7). Along the same lines, Matlosa and Karume (2004) state that “despite [a] multi-
party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system and is 
firmly in control of state power over a fairly long duration of time, that even opposition 
parties make little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party” 
(Brooks, 2004:2). 
Therefore, according to the literature and research on dominant party political 
systems, the two cases used in this thesis (Malaysia and South Africa) are examples 
of one-party dominant systems under the UMNO and the ANC respectively.  
 On the other hand, ethnic politics refers to the behavioural and attitudinal 
manifestations of role players within the polity, with reference to how political parties 
canvass and mobilise support, how the electorate votes and how the respective 
elites align. Political scientists have for long invested interest in explaining why 
mobilisation on ethnic grounds tends to spill over into violent conflict between 
respective ethnic agents and suggest that institutions within plural societies should 
be structured in a manner that will mitigate perverse effects of ethnic mobilisation 
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(Horowitz, 1998:28). In the cases used in this study, the colonial and apartheid 
history of the respective states have reinforced inter-ethnic divisions and economic 
imbalance hence impeding solidarity between major ethnic groups. In sum, because 
the socio-economic structure of South Africa and Malaysia before and after 
apartheid/independence was divided along ethnic lines, this has had a profound 
influence on the politics of both countries.  One could argue that the abovementioned 
factors/themes, namely ethnic politics and dominant party systems, are mutually 
reinforcing, given the fact that both are deeply rooted in the history of the state in 
question.  
1.5 Methodology and Research Design 
 
This study employs an empirical qualitative research approach to analysing the 
impact of the middle class in a democracy. In addition, this thesis offers a 
comparative study of the ethnic middle classes in South Africa and in Malaysia, 
premised on analysing the similarities and differences between the two cases. By 
employing this comparative approach, various existing literature pertaining to the 
middle classes in each case were consulted, including journal articles, books, and 
electronic sources. The decision to employ a comparative research approach to this 
study is grounded in the fact that the different findings for the two countries in this 
study, could offer alternative explanations for causal relationships put forth by 
modernisation theory. However, it is fundamental to note that this thesis does not 
test modernisation theory in its entirety by using a case-study comparative research 
approach, but rather that interpretations of modernisation theory are applied to the 
two cases in order to reveal the relative shortcomings of the approach towards the 
role of the middle classes in ethnically divided societies. For example, Malaysia and 
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South Africa have various similarities like pluralistic populations, colonial histories, 
and dominant party political systems underwritten by ethnic politics. These constants 
in the two cases have brought about state-sponsored ethnic middle classes, but this 
thesis is interested in the role of the aforementioned middle classes in their 
respective democracies.  
Furthermore, the comparative case study approach is employed in this study 
because the research design is derived from the research question under review. 
There are specific features of the core subject of this study (the middle class), which 
have directed the inclusion of Malaysia and South Africa as cases, namely dominant 
party systems premised on ethnic politics. Therefore, employing the comparative 
case study approach in this study, allows for the control of contextual factors in both 
countries, in order to validate the role of the middle class in these cases empirically. 
The qualitative comparative approach is also useful in this study since employing 
statistical techniques was not possible because data sets and surveys for the two 
cases were out of date, or lacked compatibility. Additionally, a key benefit of the 
comparative case study approach is the fact that one can draw generalizations with 
regard to the findings in either case, but this is also a disadvantage because findings 
used in this approach cannot be applied to a wider range of cases.  
 Hence, applying the tenets of  modernisation theory to these two cases where 
various contextual factors are taken into account, will provide reliable research on 
the response of middle class in the context of dominant party systems where politics 
are aligned with ethnicity; so that,  although theory suggests the democratic role the 
middle class should play in a state of modernity, it is also important to understand 
the influence  of a racial history, a centralised dominant political party, and the 
manner in which affirmative action policies were implemented in order to boost the 
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middle class‒thereby attaining a better and more refined  understanding of middle 
class behaviour within these settings. 
1.6 Chapters Outline 
 
The following chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) provides the reader with an extensive 
literature review on democracy and the middle class. This chapter fleshes out the 
link between democracy and the middle class, in order for the reader to have solid 
background knowledge before the two respective middle class cases are discussed 
in Chapter 3 and 4. 
 Once the reader has been provided with the necessary theoretical 
background pertaining to how middle classes role is traditionally regarded, Chapter 3 
focuses on a study of Malaysia. In this chapter, a historical overview of Malaysia is 
given, but more importantly, Malaysia’s context of one-party dominance premised on 
ethnic politics is given. The first half of this chapter deals with the Malaysian political 
economy from 1957-1969 (from independence to the demise of democracy), and the 
second half of the chapter deals with the New Economic Policy (1970-1990) which 
was fundamental to the growth of the Malay middle class. The latter part of Chapter 
3 analyses how the NEP was implemented in business, public sector employment 
and in education. 
 The thesis then moves on to discussing and analysing the second case used 
in this study. The South African case study outlined in Chapter 4 follows a similar 
structure to the Malaysian chapter, where a brief historical overview is given relating 
to apartheid. Chapter 4 also clearly illustrates the situation engendered by a 
dominant party system coupled to ethnic politics. The chapter further analyses the 
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ANC’s ideology (1994-present) of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which 
is a driving force behind the affirmative action policies of BEE and employment 
equity in the fields of business, public sector employment (bureaucracy) and in 
education. As in the Malaysian case, these affirmative action policies implemented in 
various spheres of society are one of the reasons for the growth of the black middle 
class in South Africa. 
 In conclusion, Chapter 5 of this study points out the differences or similarities 
of the two cases, and concludes by reiterating the finding that state-sponsored ethnic 
middle classes in dominant party political systems are unlikely to metaphorically bite 
the hand that feeds them; or rather to vote out the dominant party. 
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The middle class is widely regarded as the most pro-democratic social stratum in a 
society, as mentioned earlier in this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to give the 
reader a holistic understanding of not only the democratisation process, but also of 
the fundamental link between the middle class and democracy that has long been 
voiced. The chapter is structured in a manner which leads the reader into the debate 
on democratisation and economic development, with the link between democracy 
and the middle class highlighted later on. The purpose of this chapter is also to 
highlight to the reader that the literature on middle class and democracy, fails to 
account for the attitudes of the middle classes in different contexts presented by this 
thesis.  
2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Democracy and the Middle Class 
2.2.1.2 Democracy 
 
For the past 60 years, democratic theory has held a fundamental and central position 
at the core of political theory. For instance, during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, the global order has witnessed a vast number of regime transitions or 
changes in what Samuel Huntington termed the “third wave” of democratisation. This 
wave of democratisation began with regime changes in Portugal and Greece in 1974, 
which had a knock-on or domino effect on the Iberian neighbor Spain, further into 
Latin America, including the former Communist states of the Soviet Union, as well as 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
East and South-east Asia (Gill, 2000:1). According to Huntington (1991:15), a wave 
of democratisation is principally characterised by a group of regime transitions from 
non-democratic to democratic regimes, occurring over a specific period of time which 
then reverses the transitions of regimes over the same period of time. Hence, the 
third wave fundamentally changed the geopolitical map of the globe because many 
dictatorships fell, which were then replaced by governments that professed 
democratic principles and were successful at translating those principles into 
practice.  In addition, as suggested by the coined term ”third wave”, it is implied that 
there were initial transitions to democratic regimes that had come prior to this one. 
These two prior waves of democratisation started around 1828 to 1926 (where 33 
countries established minimal national democratic institutions as in the American and 
French revolutions, in Britain, and in some British colonies and independent states of 
South America), and the second wave lasted from 1943 to 1964 (characterised by 
the liberation of many countries after World war 2: Eastern Europe, European 
colonies and once again countries in South America) (Diamond, 1996:1). With this 
being said, Huntington also stipulated that every wave of democratisation was 
followed or ended by a reverse wave of democratic breakdowns. These so-called 
‘reverse waves’ are characterised by a number of the newly established 
democracies failing. Those newly established democracies that fail or regress thus 
reduce the total number of democracies globally significantly; however, more 
democracies remain throughout the international arena than had existed prior to the 
beginning of a democratisation wave (Diamond, 1996:2, Huntington, 1991:17 & Gill, 
2000:2).  
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2.2.1.3 Conditions of democracy 
 
Therefore, when one takes into consideration the waves and reverse waves of 
democratisation (the aforementioned) as a political phenomenon, social scientists 
have long grappled with the question to determine which situations are conducive to 
the establishment of a democracy, and what makes democracy as a regime type in a 
political system endure? Scholars posited answers to this phenomenon through the 
analysis of the initial waves of democratisation (first and second), which brought 
about many different approaches aimed at answering this question. For instance, an 
argument that originated from an analysis of failed democratic projects in Africa and 
Asia, was premised on the fact that a stable democratic regime is inextricably linked 
to the type of culture that is inherently present in a country (Gill, 2000:2). To 
elaborate on this thesis: scholars found a closer link between the civic culture and 
democratic forms, the presence of Protestantism, as well as a belief in the legitimacy 
of Dahl’s Polyarchy or pluralism (Gill, 2000:2). However, although this literature 
brought about a new approach and outlook as to how democracy emerges within 
states, this thesis could not account for how culture could lead to democratic political 
outcomes.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of democratisation waves produced 
another stronger and more influential approach to understanding the production and 
endurance of democracy; relating democratisation to economic development. 
According to Lipset (1959:75), the most common and widespread generalisation 
which seeks to link political systems to various other aspects of society, is that 
democracy is related to the state of economic development or modernisation in that 
country. Lipset states in his seminal article that “Concretely, this means that the 
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more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” 
(Lipset, 1959:75). In the same vein, since Aristotle, scholars have maintained that 
democracy becomes far more favourable when income inequalities amongst the 
populace are reduced (Rivero, 2000:71).  
Other theorists and scholars reiterated the same point; Diamond (1992) 
illustrated that there is a very strong causal relationship between economic 
development and democracy, and further posited that economic development is a 
key indicator as to whether democracy will manifest itself as a regime type (Diamond, 
1992:126). According to Lipset, the logic behind the link between democracy and 
economic development or modernisation, is that within a wealthy society where only 
a small minority of the populace live in real poverty, a situation could come to the 
fore where the vast majority of the population intelligently participate in politics and 
have the knowledge and capacity to refrain from succumbing to extremist ideologies 
and practices (Lipset, 1959:75). This latter point is premised on Lipset’s 
understanding of the link between economic development and the class struggle 
shown in his book Political Man: “Economic development, producing increased 
income, greater economic security, and widespread higher education, largely 
determines the form of the ‘class struggle’, by permitting those in the lower strata to 
develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics” 
(Lipset, 1963:45). Furthermore, Lipset (1959) argues that a society that has vast 
income inequalities (large impoverished mass and privileged elite) can only result in 
either oligarchy or in tyranny (dictatorship). This latter point is further cemented by 
Lipset when he states, “the relation between low per capita wealth and the 
precipitation of sufficient discontent to provide the social basis for political extremism 
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is supported by a recent comparative polling survey of the attitudes of citizens of 
nine countries” (Lipset, 1963:47).  
Lipset, although criticised for his methodology, also found that his research 
showed that democracies had a tendency of producing higher levels of economic 
development than non-democracies. Others scholars refined Lipset’s findings by 
emphasizing the importance of middle income range countries (neither poor nor rich), 
and stated that in these countries the probability of democratic regimes replacing 
authoritarian ones was highest (Gill, 2000:3). It boils down to the fact that the 
causality direction does not run from democracy to a more affluent society, but rather 
that affluence leads to democracy‒which is consistent with Huntington’s analysis 
(Gill, 2000:4). However, although the latter is generally accepted for most case 
studies like Western Europe for instance, there are exceptions in the direction of 
causality with reference to the collapse of the communist economic system (East 
and Central Europe), or cases like South Africa where democracy was ‘forced’ upon 
(internal and external pressures) the country (Rivero, 2000:75). Hence, according to 
Lipset, the reason democracies are more durable in more-developed countries, is 
that the intensity of distributional conflicts is far lower when there are higher income 
levels amongst the populace (Przeworkski et al, 1996:3). Once this has been 
established, the question arises why increased affluence leads to the inauguration of 
democratic regimes, as has happened throughout history. 
Literature and research spanning the past 150 years, have revealed that in 
the analysis of democracy, social and economic equality will naturally lead to political 
equality, since a more egalitarian society is ideal for the production of political 
democracy. This notion is further galvanised by the processes of development that 
took place at the end of the 20th century; described as ‘modernisation’, which has 
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been a force that pushed for greater equality within the spheres of politics, 
economics and socially (Rivero, 2000:72). This then leads one to analyse and 
observe certain characteristics of civil society, which could serve as preconditions for 
the emergence of democracy, and indicate the correct context for democracy to 
deepen within a given state (Rivero, 2000:72). 
Key (1949) put great emphasis on the importance of democratic institutions 
which serve to reinforce political equality amongst the populace, as fundamental to 
the organization of political competition within the state. Key’s findings were 
premised on the one-party politics prevalent in Latin South America, where single-
party politics boiled down to politics of personality at the expense of organised 
debates of pressing issues. Hence, single-party politics skewed the playing field in 
favour of those who have at the expense of those who do not have (Key, 1949:307). 
This is because within a single-party state, there is a lack of sustained political 
competition between two opposing political groups, which then leaves government 
far more vulnerable to the pressures of favouritism. Therefore, it can be noted that 
political competition on its own will not guarantee that the ‘have-nots’ within society 
will become a strong political force. Other scholars like Lenski (1966) argue that 
those who are in control of government, can determine the ‘rules’ as to how rewards 
will be distributed within society, and therefore they can govern the outcome of the 
competition for rewards (Rivero, 2000:73). However, political democracy in essence 
has given the poorer people in society greater political power in terms of those in 
control of the state being held accountable, hence impacting on how rewards should 
be distributed within society. Therefore, the notion behind the democratic ideology is 
that the disadvantaged majority wield greater political power, which then translates 
into greater social equality since the majority would want the elite to distribute 
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rewards more equally (Rivero, 2000:73). Although many different scholars have put 
forward different approaches regarding the conditions and prerequisites for 
democracy to emerge and be sustained, this thesis will make use of Lipset’s concept 
regarding ‘social conditions of democracy’, in order to indicate to the reader the 
fundamental link that lies between democracy and middle class. 
Most of the literature on the middle classes and democracy has emphasised 
and stressed that a “wide and well-developed middle class, has a positive role in the 
democratization process” (Rivero, Du Toit & Kotze, 2003:7). Furthermore, the overall 
size of the middle class indicates the current level of inequality in a society; where 
the wider and larger the middle class, the lower the level of inequality, and the 
smaller or narrower the middle class, the higher the level of inequality within a 
society. Therefore, given the aforementioned, many researchers and scholars have 
put a lot of emphasis on the relation between socio-economic inequality in society 
and democracy. For instance, Lipset states that [since] “the position in a stratification 
system is always relative and gratification or deprivation is experienced in terms of 
being better or worse off than other people, it is not surprising that the lower classes 
in all countries, regardless of the wealth of the country, show various signs of 
resentment against the existing distribution of rewards by supporting political parties 
and other organizations which advocate some form of distribution” (Lipset, 1963:48). 
Consequently, this leads one to focus on how the society is stratified according to 
social structure, and how this relates to democratisation (Rivero, Du Toit & Kotze, 
2003:7). 
With reference to Huntington’s analysis (mentioned earlier), and specifically to 
the direction of causality running from affluence to the development of democracy, 
there are a number of aspects of the process of development that seek to explain the 
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emergence of democracies. For instance, according to Cutright (1963), the more a 
country becomes economically advanced, the more that country will tend to become 
politically advanced (Cutright, 1963). This is due to the fact that the distribution of 
consumption of goods within a country tends to become more equitable as the size 
of the national income increases as well (Lipset, 1963:50). For example, if the 
country in question becomes wealthier, there will consequently be a larger proportion 
of its population which will be able to afford to buy goods like vehicles, cellular 
phones, decent housing and be able to send their children to universities.  
Furthermore, the richer or wealthier a country, the less of a difference there 
will be in the standards of living of social classes that are adjacent to one another. 
According to Lipset, “people with more income, in complex and widely 
interdependent work situations, with more education…are more likely to ask for 
increased political freedom” (Lipset, Seon & Torres 1993:166). This is due to the fact 
that increased wealth and education can only serve the notion of democracy by 
elevating the lower classes in society to a level where they are exposed to cross-
pressures, which then reduce their commitment to populist ideologies and shield 
them against extremist ideologies (Lipset, 1963:50). In addition, higher levels of 
education, access to health and services as well as higher levels of income are 
characteristics of the middle class. Therefore, as Lipset posits, when there is an 
increase in wealth and status it affects the political role of the middle class. This role 
is affected because the stratification structure of a given society changes from an 
elongated pyramid shape, to a shape that reveals more of a diamond shape2 (Lipset, 
1963:51). Hence, Lipset (based on the work of Schumpeter [1947]) states that the 
“middle classes temper conflicts by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and 
                                                          
2
 The elongated pyramid shape illustrates that the given society has a large lower-class base, whereas the 
diamond shaped stratification structure, reveals that there is a growing middle class. 
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penalising extremist groups” (Lipset, 1963:51). Because these citizens have been 
elevated in status due to the processes of development and modernisation, they can 
then make their demands heard by fostering a type of politics that accommodates 
their needs and concerns. 
The abovementioned processes of development, which involved significant 
industrialisation, naturally lead to a diverse, complex and an interrelated economy. In 
essence, economic development (affluence) generated new sources of wealth and 
power situated outside of the state, as well as a functional need to decentralise 
decision-making within the state (Huntington, 1991:65). In line with Lipset, 
Huntington states that economic development promoted certain changes within the 
social structure as well as the values that were held in support of democratisation. 
According to Huntington, economic affluence shapes the values and attitudes held 
by citizens in order to foster feelings of trust, competence and satisfaction which 
correlate strongly with the existence of democratic institutions (Huntington, 1991:65). 
Secondly, economic affluence also increases the level of education in society 
dramatically3. Therefore, the more educated a population, the more those citizens 
can relate to the values of satisfaction and competence that accompany democracy.  
Additionally, economic development allows for more resources to be available 
for the distribution to various social groups in society (Huntington, 1991:66). Lastly 
according to Huntington (and most importantly for this thesis), economic 
development within a country “promotes the expansion of the middle class: a larger 
and larger proportion of society consists of businesspeople, professionals, 
shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians, clerical and sales 
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 Between the year 1960 and 1981, Huntington states that the proportion of the relevant age group attending 
secondary school in the developing world increased twofold.  
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workers” (Huntington, 1991:66). Huntington then further elaborates on his statement 
by linking it to democracy; hence democracy is more or less premised on majority 
rule and thus becomes difficult to implement when there are vast inequalities 
resulting in confrontation of a small wealthy oligarchy by the impoverished majority. 
Therefore during the third wave movements for democratisation, the substantial 
middle class which is a product of economic development and industrialization, were 
the most active supporters of the democratisation process (Huntington, 1991:67). 
Examples of Huntington’s findings are from Brazil in the 1960s4.  
On the other hand, Muller (1995) pointed out that economic development also 
increased the size of the working class, as well as increasing the organisational 
power of the subordinate classes. Therefore, although Muller agrees with Lipset and 
others with reference to socioeconomic growth expanding the middle class, he also 
states that the “roles of the middle classes‒urban professionals, state and private 
sector employees, merchants, craftsmen, and farmers‒in the balance of class power 
is pivotal but ambiguous” (Muller, 1995:968). This is due to the fact that the middle 
class inhabits an intermediate position in the class structure, therefore making the 
middle class susceptible or prone to anti-democratic alliances with dominant classes 
(landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie). 5 Muller states that income inequality (which is 
an effect of capitalist economic development on democracy) has a negative effect on 
democratization; because class polarization is heightened and the working classes 
are radicalised despite increasing the organisational power of lower classes (Muller, 
1995:968). Therefore, the timing of the inauguration of political democracy within a 
given state or country is pivotal. For instance, if inclusive democracy (universal adult 
                                                          
4
 The Brazilian middle class overwhelmingly supported the 1964 coup. However, by the mid-to-late 1970s, it 
was the middle class which had benefitted the most from the years of on-going economic growth, and hence 
became the primary voice in demanding that Brazil return to a democratic regime. 
5
 The landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie would be those who own and manage capital and land.  
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suffrage) manifests at a time of industrialization when income inequality in a country 
is high or on the rise, the subordinate classes will be prone to the appeals of 
revolutionary socialism under an anti-democratic coalition of the upper classes 
(bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy). But, if inclusive democracy is introduced at a 
late stage of industrialisation where income inequalities are generally low or are 
declining, then the subordinate classes’ (working and middle classes) support for 
democracy should be fairly high (Muller, 1995:968). The upper classes are more 
likely to tolerate inclusive democracy as long as their economic interests and status 
are not threatened. Therefore in sum Muller posits that economic development also 
heightens income inequality in a country, and this is seen as having a negative effect 
on democracy because class polarisation will be enhanced, the subordinate classes 
could be radicalised, and the bourgeoisie will be less inclined to tolerate the political 
participation of the lower classes. 
At this point, one can assume that a large or broad middle class together with 
a stable democratic government makes a good match. In addition, a large middle 
class is indicative of the level of inequality within a society6, as well as being a 
characteristic of a stable democratic regime (Rivero, 2000:75). Furthermore, 
scholars like Rubinson and Quilan (1977) also stipulated in their work that if a 
country reflects a relatively egalitarian income distribution amongst various sectors of 
the populace, this is an indicator that a strong and independent bourgeoisie was on 
the rise. This aforementioned bourgeoisie would then be the tool or force that would 
push for parliamentary democracy which would see their economic power converted 
into its correspondent political power (Rivero, 2000:75). With this being said, one can 
then assume that those countries that have low income inequalities are more likely to 
                                                          
6
 A large and widespread middle class in a society indicates or implies that there is low income-inequality. 
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inaugurate democracy, compared to the countries that have higher income 
inequalities and where the middle class is then weak. This latter point is reiterated by 
Muller, that “income inequality has a negative impact on the level of democracy 
because it reduces the likelihood of inauguration of democracy” (Muller, 1988:61).  
Therefore, when one talks of the most influential political phenomenon in the social 
sciences, namely inclusive democracy, it is of fundamental importance to link this 
concept to economic development as illustrated in this chapter. This chapter has 
already indicated the causal direction for arriving at a democratic regime7. In sum, 
economic development is a key factor to democracy because economic 
development is accompanied by higher levels of education, income and economic 
security for the majority of the population. Hence, this translates into a change in 
values embedded amongst the populace (democratic political culture), as well as 
lowering the intensity and stakes of the ‘class struggle’ (Gill, 2000:4). In addition, 
economic development produces an increase in urbanisation and education, which 
directly implies a change in occupational structure (Rivero, 2000:75). Economic 
development also produces increased wealth, which in turn reduces the objective 
levels of income inequality within the society, and allows for the growth in size of the 
middle class. The middle class is then in a more privileged position in terms of being 
able to organise itself with reference to political parties and trade unions8, causing 
the subordinate classes to demand a pattern of politics that is more sympathetic to 
them (Rivero, 2000:75). The middle class is the group that moderates conflict, 
through the exercise of rewarding the democratic political parties and punishing the 
extreme/radical parties (Gill, 2000:4). Therefore, due to economic development, the 
                                                          
7
 Huntington (1997:5) states that: “…if you want to get democracy promote economic development”. 
8
 This organisation is further bolstered by the decrease in the peasantry and increase in the working class (also 
exposed to higher levels of education), which then allows for the lower classes to participate more directly in 
politics of the state. 
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emergence of various social groups and organisations eventually become a 
mechanism to provide a check and balance on government, but at the same time 
also to foster an increase in political participation which bodes well for the 
development of a strong civil society (Gill, 2000:5 & Rivero, 2000:76). Since 
economic development and income inequality are linked to democracy, these 
concepts give rise to the manner in which democratic regimes are supported and 
sustained. This section has highlighted the link between democracy and the middle 
class, and the following section will look into how the middle class has been studied. 
 
2.2.1.4 Middle class & Analytical Framework  
 
The previous chapter has already highlighted the different approaches used to study 
the middle class; for instance the relative definition used where the middle class are 
categorised as the most middle income distribution throughout a population, or the 
use of an absolute definition where the middle class is referred to in terms of 
affluence, lifestyle and their purchasing power. The conceptualization9 section of this 
thesis has already put forth the work done on middle class studies; therefore this 
section aims to highlight how the conceptualization of the middle class used in this 
study links to the analytical framework used. The literature on democracy and the 
middle class does not account for the role of the middle class in dominant party 
political systems driven by ethnic politics.  Thus, the purpose of this section is to 
highlight how the analytical framework used in this study links to the middle class 
and how it is conceptualized for this study. 
                                                          
9
 See section 1.4 of this thesis. 
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This thesis is concerned with the new middle class; the social class that draws 
income primarily from non-manual labour in private business and more importantly 
as state civil servants in the bureaucracy. But, a dominant party system and ethnic 
politics within a given state tend to have an impact on the make-up of the 
bureaucracy as well as the relationship between the state and capital. These two 
factors or themes form part of this study’s analytical framework for analysis of the 
middle class, due to these factors collectively having a fundamental impact on the 
quality of democracy in the state in question. The reason for including the make-up 
of the bureaucracy and the link between the state and capital as part of the analytical 
framework is due to the fact that these factors are borne out of the former more 
fundamental factors used in this study’s framework. For instance, a dominant party in 
a given state will seek to exercise their dominance through their power and influence 
over the political polity and policy-making. This objective is then achieved through 
strategically appointing party members in the institutional framework of the state 
(public domain) like the bureaucracy, as well as in the private domain like the private 
sector in business. This then has a fundamental implication on the nature of 
dominance of that political party, because the support base of that party and its 
legitimacy will not lessen since members of the bureaucracy and business cronies 
are closely linked to the party in power. These findings will be elaborated on in-depth 
in chapter three and four of this thesis. 
De Jager and Du Toit (2013:10) state the criteria for one to identify a 
dominant party system in that dominant party systems occur in  liberal and illiberal 
democracies, that the threshold for dominance by a party is sufficient enough for it to 
dominate the polity and public policy, that the nature of the dominance is founded on 
the party’s heroic history, that the dominant party is considered dominant after 
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securing four or more consecutive national elections, and lastly that the opposition 
competes in elections but is improbable of achieving success. Therefore, the frames 
of analysis used in this study to critique ‘modernisation theory’ and analyse the two 
case studies, is fitting in the sense that both Malaysia and South Africa are examples 
of dominant party systems which highlight the shortcomings and constraints on the 
middle class in their respective contexts. Furthermore, politics is aligned along ethnic 
lines in both South Africa and Malaysia. Both South Africa and Malaysia are 
dominant party systems operating with the context of a liberal democratic political 
system (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013:11). Therefore, this thesis analyses the role of the 
middle class in dominant political party systems premised on ethnic politics.  
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The literature review has shed light on the conventional wisdom of modernisation 
theory, and the link that exists between the middle class and democracy. The vast 
work already undertaken by various scholars has fleshed out what the supposed role 
of the middle class is in a democracy, although many scholars have differed in their 
approaches to studying the middle class. However, because democracy is based on 
majority rule, when an ethnic majority that has long been marginalised captures 
political power, the state-sponsorship of a specific ethnic middle class alters the 
manner in which that middle class behaves. The literature put forth in this chapter 
does not really deal with cases where dominant political parties in ethnically divided 
societies have grown ethnic middle classes via state policies of affirmative action. 
Therefore, because these middle classes in Malaysia and South Africa are state-
grown, this thesis is interested in the role the middle class plays in reinforcing 
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political dominance of their ethnic parties. The following chapter will deal with the 
Malaysian case used in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: UMNO Malaysia’s Political 
Powerhouse: Not likely to lose 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Scholars and political analysts are increasingly agreeing on the normative and 
procedural worth of a democratic regime as a way of organising politics within a 
state. It has been stipulated in the previous chapter that when democracy becomes 
‘the only game in town’ with reference to a regime type, democracy will tend to 
flourish depending on the respective facilitative conditions, social structures, 
development levels and transitional processes present within a state. The latter point 
is evident when one looks at the various waves of democratisation formulated by 
Samuel Huntington, where history has produced the transformation of many 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, to either ‘semi’ or fully-fledged democracies (see 
Huntington:1991). Some examples of these regime changes can be seen throughout 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
The purpose of this chapter is to dissect the Malaysian democracy with 
reference to the manner in which democracy came about in Malaysia. The reason for 
doing this will be to gain a deeper understanding of how UMNO came to the fore on 
a political front, how the UMNO has maintained its political dominance within the 
Malaysian polity, and whether or not the Malay middle class underwrites UMNO 
political dominance. In addition, by undertaking a historic approach to uncovering the 
story of Malaysia’s democracy, it will help the reader gain further insight into the role 
played by ethnic politics, which is a fundamental factor underwriting the UMNO’s 
dominance. The analysis of the Malaysian democracy will be done using the frames 
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of analysis outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, namely: a) one-party dominance, b) 
ethnic politics, and c) the composition of the state bureaucracy. Furthermore, while 
juxtaposing the Malaysian case and the South African case (next chapter), this 
chapter will argue that the UMNO-led government nurtured a state-sponsored Malay 
middle class via state policies which strengthened the party’s political dominance ‒ 
and how UMNO’s dominance is galvanised by continued support from the Malay 
middle class.  
This chapter will deal with the Malaysian democracy from before 
independence (as a former British colony), up until the 1990s when the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was supposed to have reached its stated targets and 
objectives. The reason for dealing with this period is that this was the time when the 
UMNO government promoted a Malay middle class. When analysing the Malaysian 
state in terms of how it operates, the basic procedural terms of democracy will be 
used. The reason for limiting the analysis of the Malaysian state to the basic terms of 
procedural democracy is to understand how the ruling coalition has managed to 
retain power within an ethnically diverse society since independence10 up until the 
present. For instance, although there are regularly-held elections at state and at 
federal levels of government and the procedures of balloting and counting being 
‘somewhat’ fair, it is contended that  various strategies and tactics are used to court 
or co-op influential segments of civil society and the middle class by the UMNO-led 
government in order to solidify support and remain in power in Malaysia. Hence, the 
implementation of special Malay rights before and after independence, as well as a 
focus on the New Economic Plan becomes fundamental. 
                                                          
10
 After independence in 1957, The Alliance (later Barisan Nasional) governed up until the riots in 1969-1971 
when democracy was suspended, and thereafter an UMNO led coalition government known as the Barisan 
National has remained in power until present.   
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3.2 Background 
 
Malaysia, situated in Southeast Asia, has attracted vast attention from scholars 
around the world in terms of the country’s strategic importance within the global 
order, despite its small size. Fundamentally, what makes Malaysia so interesting is 
the country’s diverse demographic composition; comprising indigenous Malays, 
Chinese and Indians. Malaysia has enjoyed a profound and enviable record of 
political stability and social peace which has been tainted only by the episode of May 
13th 1969, which saw the abandonment of democracy and the implementation of 
emergency powers up until 1971 (Ahmad, 1989:347). British immigration policies 
had cemented an ethnic division of labour and benefits within the polity (Case, 
1993:184). At independence from Britain, Malaysia was governed by a multiracial 
alliance put in place by “The Bargain” or “constitutional contract”. [The Alliance] 
comprises Malaysia’s three most dominant political parties, namely the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).  In simpler terms, the former British 
coloniser implemented policies that saw the recruitment of Malay aristocrats into the 
institutional structures of the state like the bureaucracy, but also restricted masses of 
Malays to peasant agricultural employment and at the same time allowed for ‘foreign’ 
Chinese entrepreneurs to take control and dominate domestic capital. For instance, 
the Prime Minister would always come from UMNO, and the Finance Minister would 
always come from the pro-business and pro-growth MCA. The deal that was struck 
was that the political primacy of Malays was guaranteed, as was the economic 
primacy of the Chinese.  However, in the period that led up to the 1969 riots, the 
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Malays realised that one cannot feed, clothe and protect people on a vote for only a 
five-year term (Mauzy & Barter, 2008).  
Years before the British relinquished power to The Alliance government, there 
were a number of factors that contributed to the reason that  the British opted for a 
broad ethnic coalition to govern the newly independent Malaysia. Britain had 
administratively controlled colonial Malaysia from 1874 up until World War Two, with 
a strategy that saw the Malay sultans retain their nominal authority within the 
respective states by means of the establishment of a residential system. This indirect 
rule essentially gave the impression that the Sultans at the time controlled the affairs 
of the state while the Malays retained political supremacy over the non-Malays 
(Verma, 2002:27).  
However, as the years went on, from the 1930s the British colonial 
administration gradually tightened their control over the Malay state, so that the 
colonial administration became more centralised and British Malaya became a 
formal political entity. However, in 1941 Japan invaded The Union of Malaya (which 
later became Malaysia) which led to disagreement amongst the ethnic communities 
in Malaysia at the time, as well as highlighting the weakness of the British in terms of 
power and prestige (Verma, 2002:29). For instance, the Japanese occupation of 
Malaysia fostered anti-Chinese rhetoric amongst Malays 11 , which resulted in a 
patriotic stance (nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments) amongst the Malays against 
the Chinese. This was the turning point at which the Malays increased their political 
power (during Japanese occupation), leaving the Chinese to resist the invasion. 
Importantly, upon returning post-war, the British sympathised with the Chinese and 
                                                          
11
 Many anti-Chinese military units (staffed by Malays) were deployed to fight Chinese resistance groups, and 
these feelings stirred up by the Japanese would later be used against the British. 
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after the Japanese had been defeated, the communist-led Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army held power before the British took over (Verma, 2002:28). This latter 
point is fundamental, because at the time of the Japanese occupation of Malaysia, 
the Chinese underground laid the foundation for possible communist insurgency in 
the years coming. Furthermore, the Malays also realised in the post-war period that 
the British began sympathising with other ethnic groups which could then put their 
political supremacy in jeopardy; hence the terms stipulated in “The Bargain” years 
down the line, when independence was achieved. 
This strategy of leaving post-independence Malaysia to be governed by a 
multi-ethnic coalition government was deemed viable by the colonists because it 
would restrict the emergence of class-based politics which could impede or threaten 
British economic interests within the country. These interests can be highlighted by 
the fact that Malaysia (after independence) would remain in the sterling area, with 
the Malaysian economy making considerable contributions “to the common pool of 
monetary reserves”, because Malaysian industry was earning dollars through its 
rubber and tin mining exports (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:22). In return for the 
contributions made, Britain would provide military protection and aid to Malaysia in 
the 1960s.  In addition, the colonial regime also channelled Chinese workers into the 
urban artisanry and tin-mining industry (Case, 1993:184). The importance of these 
developments for analytical purposes was that politics was increasingly being 
mobilised on communal lines, under the auspices of a multi-ethnic alliance‒which 
was believed to be a winning formula in meeting and mediating the demands of a 
diverse citizenry (Ahmad, 1989:354). This latter point is very similar to political 
implementation in South Africa, where the nature of the polity is premised on ethnic 
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lines as a result of the Apartheid regime where segregation was institutionalised for 
more than four decades. 
However, although the Alliance Party framework proved its worth in terms of 
mediating the communal demands articulated by the respective parties throughout 
the polity, also meeting the criterion of a cohesive political front to win independence 
from the British, the very demands submerged in winning the struggle for 
independence would later return to hamper the legitimacy of the partners in the 
Alliance (Ahmad, 1989:355). For instance, the indigenous Malays’ primacy within the 
political arena became paramount in that Malays enjoyed special citizen rights 
reinforced in the Malayan and Malaysian constitutions12.  The following section of 
this chapter will discuss the role of ethnic politics in Malaysia, which is a key concept 
in understanding how the Malay middle class grew through state intervention and 
how this Malay middle class behaves within a democratic regime. 
3.3 Ethnic Politics 
 
It is fundamental to understand that ethnic composition underwrites all issues 
pertaining to Malaysian politics, economics and societal interactions. Ethnicity in 
Malaysia influences societal arrangements, politics, and the shape of the 
constitution, which in turn influences the democratic process, the party system and 
governance in the polity (Jamil, 2010:1). According to Milne (1967), all aspects of 
Malaysian politics, society and economics are premised on considerations of an 
“ethnic arithmetic”. The premise of ethnicity was aggravated under British colonial 
                                                          
12
 Although this contract or ‘bargain’ was agreed upon by ruling elites within the inter-communal government 
at the time and seen as a necessity, many issues voiced by the minorities then came to the fore when the 
implications of these special rights were considered or materialised in the 1960s. 
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rule in the years 1874 to 1957, where the British had encouraged emigration of 
Chinese and Indians, which consequently transformed Malaysia into the ethnically 
heterogeneous society it is today. According to the Malaysian 2000 Census, 66.1% 
of the population are Malays, 25.3% Chinese and 7.4% are Indian (Malaysia, 
2002a). In addition, with reference to religion, 60.4% of the population are Muslim, 
19.2% Buddhist, 9.1% Christian, 6.3% Hindu, and the remaining accounting for other 
minority religions (Haque, 2003:243). These racial and religious differences are 
further intensified by language, since Malays speak Malay and follow Islam, Indians 
speak Tamil and practice Hinduism, and the Chinese speak different variants of 
Chinese and generally practise Buddhism.  Another term given to indigenous Malays 
used throughout literature and policy with regard to Malaysia is  “Bumiputera” which 
translates to ‘son of the soil’ (Embong, 2002).  
These aforementioned ethnic distinctions have influenced the formation of the 
state and the government’s policy agenda extensively since independence, but more 
importantly they have put the state in the centre of ethnic contestation over economic 
resources, political power, and religious and cultural existence within society (Haque, 
2003:244). As mentioned earlier, the colonial legacy left by the British had organised 
Malaysian society primarily on the basis of occupational segregation based on ethnic 
lines, where the Malays occupied the lowest societal strata as rural agricultural 
peasants. The Chinese were grounded in commerce and the Indians in plantation 
work, which reinforced interethnic division and tension, leaving no room for solidarity 
amongst these groups (Jamil, 2010:3). In sum, Malaysia’s ethnic social structure and 
racial mind-set or way of thinking, cannot be separated from the legacy of British 
colonial rule. 
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Although in the years following on independence, consociationalism was practised in 
terms of The Alliance framework, Malaysia is an ethnically divided society. Some 
scholars have gone as far as characterising the Malaysian political system as an 
“ethnic democracy” (Haque, 2003:242). Furthermore, besides ethnic conflict being 
brought about by colonialism in Malaysia, there were key domestic forces prior to 
independence in 1957 which influenced the formation of the state and constitution 
along ethnic lines. For instance, the UMNO (formed in 1946) was a formidable 
political force that advocated special Malay privileges, which resulted in the 
establishment of the Federation of the Malaya (Gomez & K.S., 1997). The previous 
Malayan Union model rejected by UMNO did not guarantee special privileges to 
Malays and gave extensive recognition to non-Malays. However, the ethnic model of 
nationhood favoured by the UMNO limited citizenship status to non-Malays and 
influenced the 1957 Constitution vastly; hence the impact of ethnic politics shaping 
state policies like the NEP and the party system later (Haque, 2003:244).  
As stipulated under Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution, Malays are to 
be afforded “special rights” throughout all spheres of government, business and civil 
society, which are then protected by the monarchy. Therefore, in an ethnically 
divided society, these constitutionally protected rights became a major source of 
tension or cleavage between bumipetera13 and non-bumipetera (Jamil, 2010:4). The 
fact that politics is aligned along ethnic lines is deeply entrenched among the 
respective ethnic groupings within Malaysian society.  Ethnic politics is so deeply 
entrenched in the Malaysian polity that Malay kings were integrated into the nature of 
the state, Islam holds a hegemonic position with reference to state religion, and 
Malay is the national language (Kassner, 2006:75). In addition, the citizenry of 
                                                          
13
 The term Bumipetera or bumiputra refers to the indigenous people of Malaysia, and includes the Malays and 
the native groups in Sabah and Sarawak. 
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Malaysia are cognisant of their ethnic background, and are constantly reminded of 
this cleavage since special Malay rights are constitutionally protected. As mentioned 
earlier, this would then have a knock-on effect on the party system that would arise 
with reference to the Barisan National (BN), and more importantly, have a massive 
impact on state policies. These affirmative action state policies are fundamental in 
understanding how the UMNO managed to grow a Malay middle class, because the 
policies affected business, education and employment in the public service. The 
following section of this chapter will discuss one-party dominance in Malaysia, which 
not only allowed the UMNO to pass extensive ethnically-based state policies, but 
was underwritten by vast ethnic polarity within the polity. 
3.4 One-Party Dominance 
 
Like the ANC has dominated the South African political scene since the first 
democratic elections in 1994, the UMNO (with its alliance partners) won the first 
nationwide Malaysian election in 1955 and became the dominant party in the 
Malaysian political system. In addition, the UMNO has not lost an election since 
independence. At the time that the UMNO had won the 1955 elections, Malaysia was 
branded by severe cleavages of ethnic fragmentation and economic stratification due 
to the country’s colonial history (Kassner, 2006:63). From the outset, the politically 
dominant Malay administration (who had then taken up positions within the 
institutions of the state as politicians) that governed after the British left in 1957 was 
economically weak and fragile. For instance, the ruling elite were in power in terms 
of controlling the state machinery, but they had very limited access to wealth, which 
was in the hands of either foreign capitalists like British corporations, or the Chinese 
(Embong, 2002:47). This consequently led to the consociational arrangements 
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drawn up between the Malay ‘administocrats’ (UMNO), the various leaders of the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
which formed the aforementioned Alliance later known as the Barisan National (BN).  
The formation of the BN was a fundamental political move by the elite, because it not 
only reinforced race cleavages where each political party represented the class 
patrons of each ethnicity, but galvanised the nature of ethnic/racial politics in 
Malaysia (Haskell, 2005). This can be seen by looking at the two biggest parties in 
the BN namely the UMNO and the MCA. For instance, although the BN includes a 
variety of multi-ethnic political parties under its umbrella, the UMNO still remains 
purely Malay and the MCA purely Chinese. This then is clearly indicative of the 
citizenry believing that only racially based political organisations can successfully 
represent their interests within the polity. 
As mentioned earlier, the BN formulated public policies and implemented 
strategies that were geared at strengthening their economic base or foundation, 
while at the same time ensuring that their support base, especially amongst the 
Malay community, was strengthened. This phenomenon was very similar to South 
Africa’s case, where South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU); including 
the African National Congress (ANC), National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP), formed a coalition after apartheid was dismantled in order to preserve 
their various ethnic identities while achieving elite multi-ethnic cooperation at 
government level (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:21). This arrangement had been 
cemented since the Federation of Malaya agreement was accepted  in 1948 during 
colonial times, where the status of Malay royal houses, the position of Malays and 
the Malay language were entrenched (Ahmad, 1989:355). Furthermore, citizenship 
rights were granted to non-Malays like the Indian and Chinese populace, as a 
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compromise measure to these groups for accepting the ‘new nation-state’ where 
Malays had special rights. These basic preconditions or rules were then used as a 
blueprint by the leaders of the new inter-communal government that ruled after 
independence.   
However, although the Malay ‘administocrats’ were economically weak, 
UMNO was politically strong and enjoyed political legitimacy, partly due to the party’s 
role it played in gaining independence from the British. Like the ANC in South Africa, 
the UMNO viewed itself as the protector of the Malays and their rights. Since the 
party’s formation in 1946, it forced the British to rescind or do away with the Malayan 
Union model which would end the Malays’ special rights within the polity, thereby 
paving the way for the UMNO to dominate politics thereafter (Mauzy & Barter, 
2008:3). According to literature on dominant political party systems, dominant 
political parties draw much of their support due to their liberation credentials. In 
Malaysia’s case, The Alliance [later became the Barisan] (featuring the UMNO, MCA 
and the MIC) was seen as the party that brought Malaysian independence from the 
British (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013). Furthermore, due to Britain’s colonial policy of 
indirect rule, Malaysia inherited a very centralised yet strong state (although it is a 
federal system) that was independent from different interest groups within the polity 
(Verma, 2002:28). Therefore, the UMNO-led Alliance government was relatively 
autonomous despite various interest groups like the economically dominant 
international and Chinese groups (Embong, 2002:47). Due to various factors like 
ethnic demographics and a colonial history, a dominant party system arose in 
Malaysia. Voting along ethnic lines underwrites Malaysian politics, because although 
there are other political parties that exist and compete against the ruling coalition, 
they have very little chance of capturing power through the political process. If one 
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looks at the two largest opposition parties, namely the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) and the Partai Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), one sees that both are ethnic 
communally based political parties (Haskell, 2005). And, even though they do try and 
appeal to multi-ethnic constituencies, they remain rather unsuccessful because the 
DAP clings to its Chinese roots, and the PAS (Islamic party) reacts to a Muslim 
Malay population (Haskell, 2005). In addition, the UMNO/BN also employ tactics of 
intimidation and sometimes repression: they have extensive control over the media, 
and also make use of restrictions governing the rules of electoral conduct to 
disadvantage the opposition (Mauzy & Barter, 2008:7).  Similar to the ANC14 in 
South Africa, the UMNO-led coalition represents a large constituency of the voting 
citizenry who are mobilised along ethnic lines, and have the power to reflect the 
voting profile and influence public policy in Malaysia. Therefore this does not bode 
well for opposition to the BN coalition. 
On the other hand, inter-race and intra-class competition and the vying 
political support bases in the 1960s, forced the state to take on a more interventionist 
and developmentalist role with reference to correcting or addressing the “Malay 
dilemma”’ (Embong, 2002:47). The “Malay Dilemma”’ according to former Prime 
Minister Mahatir Mohamed, was premised on the idea that Malays could not 
compete economically with the Chinese. This idea was influenced by social 
Darwinism and implemented in a Southeast Asian context. In his book published in 
1970, Mahatir Mohamed stated that the Chinese were hardened over the centuries 
by competition and harsh climate, whereas Malays were lazy and fattened by good 
food under the tropical sun (Buruma, 2009:34). Therefore, if the Malays were to 
compete rigorously with the Chinese, the former would be subjected to the primitive 
                                                          
14
 The ANC seeks to be a catch-all party that transcends race, ethnicity, gender and socio-economic status in 
South Africa. 
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laws where the strongest survive. This thus meant that the Malays would have to be 
systematically protected through affirmative action in business, the public service 
and throughout civil society. Hence, the strategy implemented in order to address 
this issue was to create a Malay capitalist class as well as a new Malay middle class 
that would counter the already prevalent non-Malay (mostly Chinese) bourgeoisie 
and middle class. The Malaysian state’s role with reference to Malaysia’s socio-
economic transformation can be split into four distinct phases, namely the free 
enterprise period from 1957-1969, the interventionist period from 1970-1985, the 
privatisation and liberalisation period of 1986-1997, and lastly the ‘bail out’ period 
which followed the 1997-1998 financial crisis (Embong, 2002:48).  
However, this chapter will only cover the first two periods stretching from 
independence (1957) up until 1990, which are the most important periods with 
reference to comparing to the South African case used in this study. These periods 
were when the UMNO-led government grew the Malay middle class through 
empowerment policies. Using these two periods for analytical purposes in 
comparison with the South African case, will prove pivotal in understanding why the 
respective middle classes in each country behave in the manner they do presently.  
One of the key obstacles faced by the new Alliance government which would 
prove fundamental to its success was that there was a need to address the Malay 
position in society, since the colonial government had restricted their access to 
capital, restricted access to land ownership and kept them tied to agricultural 
activities like fishing and rice cultivation. In the same breath, Blacks in post- 
apartheid South Africa had suffered the same injustices as the Malays in terms of 
being restricted to work as labourers and forced to live in ethnically designated parts 
of South Africa known as the former “homelands” (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:22). 
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Therefore, from the outset the odds were stacked against the respective Malay and 
Black populace in Malaysia and South Africa in terms of fostering the growth of their 
own capitalist and middle classes. However, by using the Malaysian case study as a 
mirror, this chapter will seek to prove how the Malaysian state (dominated by UMNO) 
deliberately intervened via state policies that were entrenched before independence, 
with reference to growing the Malay middle class in comparison to the South African 
case as mentioned earlier in this chapter. This state control is a phenomenon that 
was also evident during the rule of the National Party during apartheid, which used 
similar tactics and dominated through clientelist politics.  For instance, the state 
policies that protected Malays’ special rights or privileges can be viewed as a 
fundamental tool in fostering the support of the same Malay middle class for a Malay 
political party like UMNO (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:26). 
The rest of this chapter is structured in terms of the nature of the pivotal 
factors that led to democracy being suspended after the 1969 riots, as briefly 
indicated earlier in the chapter, and the chapter will then go on to analysing the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) which became the fundamental engine in the growth of the 
Malay middle class. In conclusion, the chapter will highlight to the reader how certain 
key aspects of Malaysian politics‒ a dominant party system, ethnic politics, and the 
composition of the bureaucracy‒restrict the positive democratic impact the middle 
class can have within a polity.    
3.4.1 En route to the death of democracy 
 
The post-colonial period of 1957-1969 has been termed by scholars as the laissez-
faire period where the state embraced the open market principle but also provided 
utilities and promoted import substitution industrialisation (Embong, 2002:48). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
Therefore, development and economic growth largely remained under the auspices 
of the private enterprise sector (local and international), although the state did 
intervene in terms of taking on the responsibility of rural development and providing 
economic infrastructure. The UMNO-led coalition knew they had to focus on rural 
development, because rural Malays formed the core contingent of UMNO’s support 
base; also, this approach was addressing the very core issue of Malays ‘catching up’ 
through reducing extreme poverty (Van Der Westhuizen, 2002:25). This approach 
worked well in terms of spurring on economic growth for Malaysia; however, it 
undermined the issue of addressing the Malay dilemma. Hence, the Alliance formula 
proved successful in terms of to some extent ‘quelling’ the demands of ethnic politics 
within the polity, as well as being compatible with a framework or parliamentary 
democracy ; nevertheless,  the state’s playing a rather restrained role heightened the 
sense of insecurity experienced by Malays who were economically weak (Ahmad, 
1989:357). For instance, in 1957 the Chinese Malay capitalist and middle class were 
sizeable, including a Chinese proletariat, despite the fact that the Malays were the 
majority of the population as shown in Table 1 and 2 below.  
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Break-down of Occupation by Ethnicity in Malayasia in 1957.15 
  
Table 1: Professional and Technical Jobs 
Chinese Malay Indian & Other 
57% 34% 9% 
 
                        
Table 2: Administrative and Managerial Jobs 
Chinese Malay Indian & Other 
62.4% 17.6% 12% 
(Embong, 2002:36). 
 
These statistics were evident with reference to the employment category, as well as 
the percentage of corporate ownership owned by race or ethnicity. An example of 
the vast difference in economic power between the respective ethnic factions in the 
Malaysian polity, was that in 1970 the Malay total share of capital was RM5329.2 
million in peninsular Malaysia, the total share owned by Malay corporates was a 
                                                          
15
  These occupations include the professional, technical, administrative and managerial jobs that employees 
could hold. One should keep in mind that in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the middle class refers to ‘white-collar 
employees’ in the professional, administrative and managerial jobs. 
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mere 2.4 percent, and only 1.6 percent owned by Bumiputera16 (Malay) individuals17 
(Embong, 2002:49). These numbers are completely dwarfed by the Chinese 
corporate contingent who owned 22 percent, 63.3 percent being owned by 
international capital and 10 percent of ownership being unknown. 
The same statistics were reflected amongst middle class occupations in 
Malaysia in 1957 as in 1970, where according to Embong of the “31 353 employees 
in the administrative and managerial category in 1970, only 24.1 percent were 
Malays compared to the 63 percent that were Chinese” (Embong, 2002:49). This did 
not bode well for the Malay populace because middle class occupations like 
managerial and professional posts were key in terms of upward mobility and socio-
economic status. At best, the trend which was prevalent at the time in Malaysia was 
that many Malays who held professional positions were restricted to professional and 
technical jobs like teaching and nursing. In addition to being underrepresented 
compared to the other ethnicities (Chinese and Indians) with reference to the class 
struggle and higher earning occupations, the state’s policy of leaving growth and 
development to the forces of the market, produced a growth rate of 2.5 percent 
annually but also produced a vast gap in inequality at the time (Embong, 2002:51). In 
the light of this, the literature on democracy put forth in the previous chapter, 
stipulates that if a big gap exists in terms of inequality amongst the population, this is 
a clear indication that there is likely to be a small middle class present within the 
polity. Given this climate at the time, the class struggle and ethnic tensions that were 
                                                          
16
 Bumipetera or Bumiputra is a Malay term used in the country to embrace the native or indigenous people of 
the Malay islands. The term was coined by the activist Tunku Abdul Rahman and loosely translates to “son of 
land or “son of the soil”. 
17
 The numbers for Blacks in South Africa after apartheid would be far lower than that of their Malay 
counterparts, simply because the Apartheid system or regime was premised on racial segregation geared 
towards securing White supremacy or dominance over the indigenous Blacks. 
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felt by Malays became connected and intertwined18, hence these ethnic tensions 
leading to the May 1969 riots (Embong, 2002:51).  
Table 3: Break-down of Occupation by Ethnicity in 1970 
Category Malays Chinese 
Indian & 
Other 
Total (%)
19
 
Percentage 
increase 
1957-1970 (%) 
Professional & 
technical 
47.1 39.5 13.4 4.8 129.8 
Administrative 
and Managerial 
24.1 62.9 13 1.1 22.9 
Clerical 35.4 45.9 18.7 5 131.1 
Sales 26.7 61.7 11.6 9.1 41.8 
Service 44.3 17.3 38.4 7.9 23.1 
Agricultural 72 17.3 10.7 44.8 6.5 
Production, 
transport & 
others 
34.2 55.9 9.9 27.3 93.6 
Total 51.8 36.6 11.6 2850.3  
(Embong, 2002:50). 
  
                                                          
18
 One should keep in mind that these tensions were already prevalent earlier in Malaysian history, and hence 
became intensified leading to the 1969 riots. 
19
 This total percentage represents the total percentage breakdown of the Malaysian population by 
occupational category in 1970. Therefore, it is evident that 44.8 % of the population worked in the agricultural 
sector, but of those working in the agricultural sector an overwhelming 72%  were Malays. 
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3.4.2 Re-visiting One-Party Dominance and Ethnic Politics 
 
The 1969 riots happened after the 1969 election where the UMNO-led alliance lost 
its two-thirds majority in parliament leading to ethnic riots between the Malays and 
Chinese populations. However, although this lead to the abandonment of democracy 
and the declaration of a state of emergency in the country, it would later reinforce the 
already prevalent political dominance of the UMNO in Malaysia. For instance, the 
riots led to major policy changes like the addition of many more political parties to the 
ruling Alliance or coalition, which then formally became known as the BN (Haskell, 
2005). Furthermore, Gerakan (Chinese party) and the PAS (only later to be ejected 
in 1977) were included into the alliance (Kassner, 2006:69). These policy changes 
increased the strength of the UMNO-led coalition because its voter base was 
significantly enlarged (with UMNO being the chief contributor), hence “decision-
making began to occur more and more within the party [not in Parliament], and 
government culture became more and more Malay, granting the UMNO ’hegemonic 
sway’ over the state” (Haskell, 2005). In addition, the incoming parties into the BN 
were included on UMNO’s terms, and this reduced the bargaining power of the MCA 
and MIC in the alliance through the recruitment of opposition parties that represented 
the same ethnic interests as UMNO. However, although there was formal equality of 
party representation in the BN organisation structure, UMNO always had the lion’s 
share of BN seats in Parliament (Kassner, 2006:69). Scholars have asserted that 
this new power configuration reflected ‘coercive consociationalism’, because behind 
the guise of the BN, the UMNO hegemonic position allowed for the party to pass 
more exclusive policies that would benefit the Malays directly (Kassner, 2006:69).  
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The 1969 riots proved that the original consociational framework stipulated in the 
“Great Bargain” was not working, because the laissez-faire economic policy followed 
by the Alliance government after independence increased income inequality 
amongst different ethnicities in Malaysia. Although the previously disadvantaged 
Malays held political office, they were economically weak, fostering the idea of their 
being separate but unequal compared to other ethnicities. The Malays were 
dissatisfied that their economic position in Malaysian society could not be bettered or 
altered, and non-Malays like the Chinese felt like they had been reduced to second 
class citizens in terms of Malays having first choice in administrative jobs and 
Chinese not being recognised as an official language (Ahmad, 1989:360). To further 
these already prevalent ethnic tensions, Malays viewed the Chinese assertion as an 
attempt to undermine the institutionalised Malay political supremacy, since the 
Chinese already had an upper hand in the economic sphere.  
Therefore, in order to control the ethnic violence instigated by the riots, a state 
of  emergency was proclaimed under article 150 of the federal constitution, whereby 
all powers and authorities were conferred on the king and democracy suspended up 
until 1971 (Verma, 2002:62). Correspondingly, more or less around the same time 
(1960s), racial tensions were on the rise in South Africa, sparked off by negative 
trading terms which resulted in the apartheid government tightening their 
authoritarian political rule. These racial tensions were highlighted by the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960, which consequently resulted in a massive outflow of international 
capital between 1960 and 1964; hence creating a balance-of-payments crisis and 
the banning of the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Communist Party in 
order to repress labour and foster political stability (Van Der Westhuizen, 2002:60).  
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3.4.3 Addressing the Malay dilemma: The New Economic Policy (NEP) 
 
The Alliance phase of Malaysian politics was ended by the 1969 riots, as stated in 
the previous section, due to the fact that the government’s economic policies 
(premised on growth rather than redistribution) could not satisfy the needs of the 
respective ethnic constituencies throughout the polity. For instance, by 1970, the 
Malays were still the poorest ethnic population group in Malaysia, a situation  
compounded by the fact that they were not adequately represented (in relation to the 
country’s demographics) in Malaysia’s modernised sectors of the economy. In 
addition, although poverty was widespread across all ethnic groups at the time, 
unemployment and poverty was felt the worst amongst the Malay populace (Teh, 
2002:338). Furthermore, the rural Malays who were the strongest contingent of 
UMNO support, felt discontented vis-á-vis their position, compared not only to other 
ethnic groups like the Chinese and the Indians, but also in comparison to the urban 
Malay middle class‒who in turn felt aggrieved for not being able to secure their share 
of the nation’s economic wealth (Rohan-Jones, no date (n.d.):4).  
After democracy was inaugurated in South Africa in 1994, the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) implemented a redistributionist economic policy (RDP) which 
was later replaced by an orthodox neo-classical macro-economic policy known as 
GEAR. This phenomenon was the direct opposite of what happened in Malaysia 
after the riots of 1969, where there was a shift from pro-growth towards redistribution 
(under the NEP). However, in line with the literature of democracy and the success it 
achieved there, scholars advocated the path that Malaysia had initially taken, 
advocating growth and development first and democracy following thereafter (Lipset, 
1959:75). However, there are differences pertaining to the two case studies:  
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Malaysia won independence from the British whereas democracy was forced in the 
post-apartheid South African state. Furthermore, pressures of globalisation were far 
more severe when the ANC government took over the reins of government, 
compounded by pressures of domestic capital to adopt a neo-classical market 
orientated approach to growth and redistribution.  
The pro-redistributionists therefore realised that promoting growth (because 
the Malaysian economy did grow at an average of around 5 percent annually under 
the leadership of the Alliance government) without a sufficient and effective program 
addressing redistribution, would only benefit non-Malays and hence reinforce the 
prevalent ethnic tensions. Therefore, “reducing the income imbalance between the 
major ethnic groups was to be supplemented by employment creation for Malays, 
through rapid labour-intensive methods and the pursuit of economic growth through 
rapid, export-led industrialisation” rather than ISI (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:28). 
Hence, this ushered in the New Economic Policy (NEP), describing its objectives as 
follows: 
The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels 
and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The 
second prong aims at accelerating the process of restructuring the Malaysian society 
in order to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function (Teh, 2002:338). 
The NEP was vastly different to the previous more conservative Alliance government 
economic policy, in that the NEP was far more interventionist, which granted the 
state leeway to intervene‒and although the NEP was premised on export-led 
industrialisation with an open economy the fundamental difference was that the NEP 
was committed to redistribution as a priority over growth (Rohan-Jones, n.d.:5). For 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
instance, the plan aimed at eradicating poverty through immense public sector outlay 
which was to be coordinated by government, and this allowed for the economic 
growth rates to actually triple between 1970 and 1990, from an average growth of 
7.8 percent in the 1970s (Rohan-Jones, n.d.:5).  
In comparison, the ANC government would take extra care in making such 
bold projections regarding poverty alleviation, because the majority of the South 
African population and especially Blacks live in dire poverty after eighteen years of 
democracy. In addition, the economic plan also managed to reduce peninsular 
Malaysia’s poverty from 49.3 percent to 15 percent. The NEP was also vocal in its 
objective of establishing new commercial and industrials sectors, which would then 
be the guarantor of employment of the Malaysian populace in accordance with the 
country’s demographic break-down. The state would fund a number of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that would later be privatised to benefit Malay businessmen, and 
the state would treat Malays “preferentially vis-à-vis admission to universities, the 
state public service and with economic ventures” (Kassner, 2006:76). The NEP 
however required vast state intervention in the economy, namely resource allocation, 
public sector ownership and the control of business enterprises (Teh, 2002:339).  
Comparatively, the ANC in South Africa also looked to redress the socio-
economic imbalances brought on by apartheid under the ideology of the National 
Democratic Revolution (NDR), which would advocate affirmative action policies and 
employment equity in the public and private sectors. The SOEs mentioned earlier 
were introduced in order to expand the opportunities for Malays to partake in the 
commercial sectors. The SOEs would take up share capital on behalf of the Malays, 
where it was then put in a trust until they could be purchased.(Teh, 2002:339). In 
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addition, quotas and subsidies were also introduced so as to protect the participation 
of Malays in certain areas.  
The new manufacturing sector replaced the old colonial agricultural sector as 
the foundation of GDP, exports maintained the country’s growth rate, and the 
discovery of natural resources (oil reserves) which coincided with the world 
commodities boom underwrote the economic success (Rohan-Jones, year:5). The 
NEP itself underwent various forms of growth after being implemented in 1971, 
beginning with the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) (Embong, 2002:51). For 
instance, the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) ushered in a change in the 
industrialisation policy of Malaysia shifting from a more labour-intensive 
industrialisation strategy towards a more capital and technology-intensive one 
(Embong, 2002:51). The following section of this chapter will illustrate to the reader 
the impact of the NEP in certain key spheres like business, the bureaucracy and 
within academia; notably these various spheres are fundamental to the upward 
mobility of the Malays.  
3.5 The Growth and co-optation of the Malay middle class 
 
The literature on democracy put forth in chapter two of this dissertation, clearly 
stipulated that growth and development within a state or polity brought with it 
opportunities of upward social mobility for subordinate classes through education, 
increased occupational openings leading to better employment, which in turn leads 
to greater or better income and increased income security (Lipset, 1963:51). 
Therefore, once the Malay nationalists, like the ANC nationalists, achieved political 
hegemony of their respective states, these elites advocated the enhancement of the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
subordinate classes’ (predominantly made up by the Malays and Blacks 
respectively) social mobility through the exercise of state intervention in the economy 
and through various policy mechanisms. For instance, according to studies done 
during the 1970s, of the total number of households living below the poverty line, 
seventy-five percent were Malay and the problem was further compounded by the 
fact that Malays held perhaps one percent of investment in businesses (Verma, 
2002:62). Therefore, the decision by the state to incorporate the NEP as part of the 
Second Malaysia Plan can be ascribed to the fact that the state had realised that 
widespread poverty (especially amongst Malays) had resulted in the major social 
discontent and was detrimental to the government’s objective of solidifying national 
unity. 
Hence, the strategy implemented was geared towards assisting Malays “to 
progressively gain control of corporate ownership, secure their proportionate share 
of employment [predominantly in the public service], improve their education and 
skills levels, and facilitate migration from rural to urban areas” (Verma, 2002:69). The 
newly democratised South African state, led by the ANC government after the 1994 
elections, also looked to achieve national unity through reconciliation between the 
various ethnic groupings (especially between Whites and Blacks), but also more 
importantly to elevate the socio-economic status of previously disadvantaged ethnic 
groups (under apartheid) like Blacks, Coloureds and Indians through state policies. 
These provisions then manifested in state policies like The Second Malaysia Plan, 
including the plans that followed, and the affirmative action policies of the post-
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apartheid ANC government encapsulated in its ideology of the National Democratic 
Revolution20 (NDR). 
As mentioned earlier, the political-economic system of Malaysia was premised 
on the three factors of export-led industrialisation, the emergence of party capitalism 
as well as a fast-growing state sector that was fuelled by the financial backing of 
public enterprises. Hence, the NEP made the Malaysian state both an initiator and 
guardian of the economy (Verma, 2002:69). This very state regulated the relations 
between domestic private capital and foreign capital which allowed for a bureaucratic 
class that was sympathetic to the upwardly mobile interests of Malays, and hence to 
foster the means by which a Malayan capitalist and middle class could emerge. 
Furthermore, new institutions were created in order to forge a Malay entrepreneurial 
community (Verma, 2002:69). Examples of these new institutions were referred to in 
the Mid-term review of the Second Malaysia Plan as comprehensive, because they 
would encourage  the development of “modern commercial and industrial activities in 
rural areas, new growth centers and existing urban centers” (Verma, 2002:69). 
These institutions would go on to play a fundamental role in creating opportunities for 
Malays to participate, especially rural farmers who could subsequently make the 
move from traditional to modern agricultural activities. Therefore, the NEP with its 
more interventionist face-lift, would restructure the Malaysian economy via state 
subsidies, employment quotas, scholarships and other special preferences granted 
to Malays in order to achieve greater wealth distribution to the subordinate classes, 
and foster a new bumiputera human resource development (Verma, 2002:70). 
Similar employment quotas and scholarships were granted to the previously 
disadvantaged groups in South Africa, not only in the workplace (in business and the 
                                                          
20
 The NDR will be highlighted and discussed more rigorously in Chapter 4 of this thesis, where the South 
African case study is dealt with. 
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state) but were also implemented in the national sporting arena and in the intellectual 
community. 
3.5.1 Affirmative Action in Academia, Public Service and in Business 
 
3.5.1.1 The Malay-dominated Bureaucracy 
 
A clear impact of the NEP was seen in educational employment and promotional 
opportunities which were fundamental for upward mobility of the Malays; hence the 
Malay domination of the bureaucracy must be understood in this context. It can be 
argued that due to historical and cultural factors as well as a private sector 
dominated by non-Malays, Malays exhibit a greater preference for public 
employment compared to other ethnicities in Malaysia. In this context, the ‘special 
rights’ and preferential treatment accorded to the Malays because they lagged 
educationally behind the Chinese and Indians, meant that Malays were to be 
preferentially recruited into the public service (Lim, 2007:1507).  
However, during colonial rule under the British the ethnicisation process of the 
public service had already begun, where the sons of aristocratic Malays were trained 
to join in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS)21 and the Malay Administrative Service 
(MAS) (Haque, 2005:247). During colonial times, ordinary Malays and non-Malays 
were left out and could only join the technical and professional services. But, in 1953 
when non-Malays were first admitted to work in the MCS, it was stipulated that a 
ratio of Malays to non-Malays entering into the MCS had to be 4:1 (Lim, 2007:1508). 
This set the platform for this special ethnic quota to be expanded after independence 
was granted from the British, since Article 153 of the Federal Constitution had 
                                                          
21
 The MCS was entirely British-Malay up until the years before independence, and non-Malays were only 
admitted into the MCS in 1953. 
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entrenched the special Malay rights out of the realm of questioning. The 
aforementioned quotas pertaining to public service employment were then 
‘authorised’ and protected under the Constitution (Lim, 2007:1508). It must be 
mentioned that although the MCS upheld an ethnic ratio of 4:1, the External Affairs 
Service, Custom Service, Judicial and Legal Service applied an ethnic ratio of 3:1 
(Haque, 2005:247). No ethnic quota existed for the professional and technical 
services or other lower level services in Malaysia. Therefore, as more and more 
Malays acquired the necessary education, the lack of which they had been 
marginalized by, the government (especially after the NEP was introduced) began 
employing more Malays in order to fill these positions. It must also be noted that 
during the seventies, the public sector expanded fast (partly to provide employment 
for Malays), and the proportion of new jobs filled by bumipeteras extended to 83% in 
1977-1980 (Lim, 2007:1508). This finally reflected an overall recruitment ratio of 4:1 
between Malays and non-Malays in Malaysia’s public service, after the government 
merged the MCS with the External Affairs, Judicial, Legal and Customs Services to 
create the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service (Haque, 2005:248). 
 Therefore, within a polity mobilised along ethnic lines and dominated by the 
UMNO, ethnic preferential policy within the public service led most Malays into 
occupying senior political and administrative positions. In part, this helped the UMNO 
and the Malays to dominate the chief institutions of the state, especially the 
bureaucracy, to which the majority of middle class Malays owed their socio-
economic status.  To reiterate, the state thus became the initiator and guarantor of 
employment to the majority of middle class Malays: public sector employment had 
grown from 12% in the 1970s to 15% in 1981 (Embong, 2002:53). The latter point is 
fundamental to the study of the middle class, because the middle class is 
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conceptualised according to occupation. Therefore, since that state was the largest 
employer, essentially the state was the guarantor of middle class lifestyles to 
previously disadvantaged Malays.  
  Statistically, although Malays were underrepresented in the higher earning 
professional and technical services (doctors, engineers, accountants) at around 
20%, by the early 1970s the percentage of Malays in the elite Malaysian Civil 
Service (MCS) had reached 87% (Haque, 2005:253). However, by 1984 the Malay 
representation in the professional public service had improved significantly; in the 
education service percentages were 55% Malay, 36% Chinese and 7% Indian; the 
medical service had 29% Malay, 24% Chinese and 38% Indian employees; and in 
the accounting service where 51% were Malay, 35% Chinese and 7% Indian 
(Haque, 2005:253). With such drastic improvement in the Malaysian public service in 
terms of employing predominately Malays, the public service can be seen as 
politicised. The UMNO has embedded itself deeply amongst the Malay populace as 
their protector; coupling it with the dominant party’s capture of the state machinery 
the scope of patronage is expanded. In addition, intertwined with ethnic antagonism 
the Malay middle class has grown due to preferential state policies evident in 
bureaucratic employment statistics. Therefore the politicisation of the Malaysian 
bureaucracy, galvanised by ethnic loyalty, points to the fact that the Malay middle 
class is loyal to the ruling party that underwrites its dominance. The next section will 
look at affirmative action in academia and education. 
3.5.1.2 Malay Preferential Policy in Education 
 
The special Malay rights were also replicated in the sphere of education and 
academia since education is seen as the key to the social upward mobility of a 
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specific ethnicity or group. The implementation of preferential policy in education was 
fundamental in terms of the Malays ‘catching up’ with the Chinese and Indians in 
Malaysia, because a higher level of education tends to secure a high-earning 
occupation, which allows for one to move up the social rankings. Therefore, after 
independence the UMNO-led coalition government took measures to deepen the 
special rights of Malays in education through “offering [Malays] generous 
scholarships, expanding their admission quotas, lowering their admission 
requirements and creating institutions for their professional training” (Haque, 
2005:249). In addition, the special Malay rights were protected by the Constitution 
under Article 153 where the King was empowered (after the 1969 riots) to force 
authorities to reserve a proportion of places in universities, colleges and other 
educational institutions for Malay students. 
Statistically, according to Van der Westhuizen (2002:29), in the late 1960s 
Malays only constituted 25.4 percent of the entire student population at the 
University of Malaya, but this number was nearly doubled in the 1980s when Malay 
students made up 49.4 percent of the student population. In addition, the state did 
not only broaden and expand the country’s university sector by increasing the 
number of universities in the country (six were added after 1970 and three more in 
later years), the state also lowered educational requirements to accommodate the 
previously disadvantaged and also granted scholarships and educational grants to 
“nearly every Malay, rich or poor” (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:29). These provisions 
provided Malays who previously could not afford it the opportunity to attend 
university and hence have a chance at securing a respectable job with higher 
income, and income security. In the same way, the previous apartheid regime also 
established four ‘Afrikaner’ universities up until the 1960s to foster the same 
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opportunities for Whites (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:30). However, the ANC 
government that took over the reins in 1994 was plagued with fiscal issues it had to 
overcome before it could replicate the same strategy. Nevertheless, the ANC has 
paid a great deal of attention to management issues at South African universities, 
pertaining to issues of transformation, and more accurate student and staff 
representation to reflect the South African state’s demographics. 
The state had also stipulated that Malay would be the sole official language, 
which also converted English-medium schools to Malay-medium schools in order to 
benefit the rural Malays and thus aid  easier entry into the modern economy  to the 
disadvantaged Malay community (Jamil, 2010:6). In addition, the dominance of the 
Malay language impacted on public sector employment, because proficiency in the 
Malay language was a requirement which skewed the playing field in favour of 
Malays (Haque, 2005:249). During the early 1980s the UMNO government started 
converting traditionally English into Malay schools, and the option was given to 
Chinese schools to either convert and become Malay schools or continue outside the 
National System of Education as private schools (Jamil, 2010:10). 
A similar phenomenon played out in the 1960s in South Africa, where 
Afrikaans was made the alpha language, especially with reference to language of 
instruction in schools, but post-apartheid South Africa has 11 official languages 
where English is the means of upward mobility. The difference between the two case 
studies in question, is that the Malaysian government had a more interventionist and 
hands-on approach to creating pathways for the Malays to close the gap in income 
disparity and standard of living that existed between Malays and non-Malays, 
whereas the post-apartheid government was far more constrained by issues of 
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national unity, given South Africa’s turbulent past, domestic capital and by external 
international forces which placed fiscal restraints on the ANC government.  
Therefore, it is evident that the UMNO government played a fundamental role 
in buttressing the special rights of Malays in education and through language. This is 
significant because it created a pathway for Malays to elevate their socio-economic 
status. At the University of Malaya (one of the biggest and highly ranked in 
Malaysia), ethnic composition drastically changed from “21% to 40% for Malays, 
from 60% to 49% for the Chinese, and from 19% to 11% for Indians” by the early 
1970s (Haque, 2005:252). In addition, between 1970 and 1985, the percentage of 
Malay students at tertiary level increased from 40% to 63% the  total of which 
illustrates the effectiveness of state-provided special preferences via the quota 
system (Haque, 2005:252). However, the strategy of addressing the past’s 
imbalances via ethnic prioritisation across all spheres, can be seen as a strategy of 
the ruling party’s co-option and courting of the Malay middle class. The state policies 
in education and language are beneficial to the Malay majority within the polity, 
therefore during election-time middle class Malays will prioritise UMNO dominance at 
the polls so that their socio-economic status is secured in the future. The next 
section will look at preferential Malay policies under the NEP in business. 
3.5.1.3 Preferential Malay Policy in Business 
 
After the implementation of the NEP, Malaysia had enjoyed stable growth rates 
within an effective state but still one that had not achieved embedded autonomy22 
                                                          
22
  This concept refers to a strong and central state that is not alienated from society, hence if it achieved 
embedded autonomy it could mobilise the citizenry to identify with the national project, which eased state 
practice of extracting tax revenue from society and retain legitimacy. However, due to the fact that the state 
had to address the Malay dilemma after the riots of 1969, the embedded autonomy could not be achieved 
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that would allow  for government to expand the state enterprise sector, acquire major 
enterprises from the private sector, and embark on a strategy that was premised on 
securing Malaysian equity and employment through the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA). The NEP had stipulated the target of attaining a 30% Malay ownership and 
participation in industrial and commercial sectors by the year 1990, in the context of 
a rapidly expanding economy (Mandla, 2006:28). By the mid-1970s, the growth of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was so fast that the “SOE sector expanded at a rate 
of over 100 enterprises per annum, contributing up to 25 percent of GDP in 1990” 
(Embong, 1996:540).  
Furthermore, public enterprises, statutory bodies like Petronas and economic 
development corporations owned by the state would then create companies which 
would then enhance conditions for a Malay bourgeoisie to emerge. For instance, 
many government departments reserved contracts especially for Malay firms23 (Van 
der Westhuizen, 2002:31). This process of ‘tendering-out’ of government contracts to 
Malays, is indicative as to why the Malay middle class is loyal to the UMNO so that 
such preferential policies could remain in place. This same sort of pattern is evident 
both during the apartheid regime and post-apartheid South Africa where there is a 
state tendering system that awards contracts to Afrikaner and African entrepreneurs 
under state policies like BEE. In addition to the tendering or contract system 
prevalent in Malaysia, there were very close linkages between the heads of these 
companies and political elites which have fostered a political culture of patronage. 
For instance, what Verma termed party capitalism manifested through “a range of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
because there were factions in the citizenry like the Chinese and Indians that were critical of the Malay special 
rights, hence the state failing to forge an alliance with domestic capital (Chinese) and opting to bypass Chinese 
capital (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:34). 
23
 According to Van der Westhuizen, the Ministry of Public Works and Utilities as well as the 
Telecommunications Department both reserved 30 percent of contracts for Malay firms only. 
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practices whereby benefits of State economic sponsorship and protection are 
channelled to individuals, groups and private companies that are associated to 
UMNO” (Verma, 2002:71). This would result in a blurring of the public and private 
spheres and more importantly, a blurring of interests of the state and UMNO 
business interests, since UMNO was the dominant political party. Once again, this 
can be found in the South African case study as well, where many who benefitted 
from BEE deals in the initial periods (1994-2003) were politically connected to the 
ANC.  
In essence, the NEP state allowed for Malay ‘administocrats’ to hold public 
political office, and at the same time to hold positions in the private spheres as 
directors, trust managers and entrepreneurs in a tightly knit web of the ruling 
bureaucracy/political/business network. This phenomenon can also be seen in the 
South African case study where many leading black businessmen have forged very 
strong ties within the Tripartite Alliance and especially with the ruling ANC party. In 
Malaysia, this phenomenon would later emerge as detrimental to the NEP itself, 
because although the NEP reduced the inter-ethnic economic disparities, 
redistribution was somewhat neglected whereas patronage ensured the perpetuation 
of elite control (Verma, 2002:71). The restructuring of the economy took priority over 
the reduction of poverty. South Africa’s BEE policy seems to yield similar results in 
terms of only benefitting politically well-connected businessmen. 
Therefore, the Malay middle class expanded rapidly due to the huge growth in 
the public enterprise because the Malay-dominated government had purposefully 
restructured the economy to benefit Malays. The middle class that had emerged 
from state interventionist strategies must be considered to have been consciously 
shaped by the UMNO-led government taking into account the way the middle class 
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would react to certain situations. For instance, the majority of Malay middle class24 
members are very dependent on the very government policies that elevated them to 
the socio-economic status they now hold, and hence these middle class members 
are probably more prone to identify with and commit to the UMNO government, than 
with other non-Malay middle class members who are against the very policies that 
benefit Malays (Verma, 2002:72). The special privileges25 granted to Malays and 
institutionalised via public policy like the NEP, resemble in essence a South African 
version of an affirmative action program only practiced (prior) in Malaysia. But this 
exponential state intervention yielded promising results for Malays because by 1975, 
32% of Malays were in manufacturing jobs, 17% of managers were Malay, and 
Malay share of institutional credit stood at 30% (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:31). 
Similarly, because South African party politics is also aligned along ethnic lines like 
in Malaysia, the ‘emerging’ black middle class in South Africa can also be suspected 
of being uncritical of the ANC government. However, although there is evidence that 
has revealed that those belonging to the new black middle class have expressed 
dissatisfaction and displeasure with many aspects of the ANC government’s 
performance and policies post-apartheid, the ANC as the ruling party still provides 
the black middle class with economic leverage (Schlemmer, 2005:11). Hence, the 
new black middle class is consciously shaped by the ruling party and therefore 
retains a powerful sense of solidarity with the ANC and its hegemonic project.  
After the Second Malaysia Plan was implemented, Malaysia benefitted from 
the high and stable prices of the primary commodities it has been richly blessed 
                                                          
24
 The middle class would include white collar workers, technocrats and bureaucrats. 
25
 These special rights included business ownership, investment incentives and employment quotas that had to 
be adhered to. 
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with.26 Hence, the Malaysian state increased its stake in the economy until it reached 
its pinnacle with the implementation of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) in the 
1970s (Searle, 1999:43). The ICA basically compelled private companies of certain 
sizes to reorganize in order to accommodate a racial quota at all levels. Many who 
were marginalised by the ICA, like the Chinese and foreign-owned businesses, tried 
to counter the implementation of the Act, but found it more feasible to accept joint 
ownership which would then apportion 30 percent of share capital to Malay interests 
or bumipetera’s. These enterprises therefore had to ensure the participation of 
Malays either directly or through trust agencies, because they would not be afforded 
a license to operate unless NEP requirements were fulfilled.  
Therefore, foreign capital ‘countered’ state intervention by recruiting Malay 
politicians into directorate positions and even began funding UMNO, whereas 
Chinese Malay capital aimed to diversify their operations abroad. This phenomenon 
was also evident during and after the apartheid era where politically connected 
Afrikaners and later Africans were recruited to directorships. In essence, the ICA 
(which gave the state the capacity to rigorously enforce the NEP) was a policy shift 
premised on state intervention in industrialisation, which would then lay the proper 
platform for the emergence of the Malay business class (Gomez & Jomo, 1997:38). 
Between the years 1970 and 1990, bumipetera share equity in listed share 
corporations increased from 2.4% to 19.3% even though it fell short of the NEP’s 
target of 30%. The idea behind set targets for transferring equity shares and 
ownership to bumipetera was not only to address the Malay dilemma in terms of 
them ‘catching up’ to other ethnicities, but also for the emergent Malay class to 
remain loyal to the UMNO government. But this policy shift did have a negative effect 
                                                          
26
 These commodities include tin, rubber, crude petroleum and palm oil. 
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in terms of encouraging capital flight and a ‘regression with reference to domestic 
investment’ as a result of a ‘forced’ rapid redistribution in order to yield government 
performance results among the Malays. The Malaysian state over-relied on foreign 
investment with domestic non-Malay capital being marginalised; hence this resulted 
in the absence of a Malay State-Chinese capitalist alliance, which is fundamental to 
plans of industrialization, growth and development. 
The preferential policies within business under the NEP managed to reduce 
poverty amongst the Malays; however, it did increase inequality intra-ethnically 
(Mauzy & Barter, 2008:25). More importantly for the purpose of this thesis, the NEP 
created a path for the emergence of a Malay urban working class, a Malay business 
class and a Malay middle class. However, in Malaysia it can be argued that social 
upward mobility cannot be divorced from close ties and links to the ruling UMNO 
political party. The ruling UMNO state directly intervened through state policies in 
various spheres of society, and created the opportunity or conditions for the 
emergence of a Malay middle class that shares its ideology.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The policy shift towards a more interventionist approach to industrialisation under the 
ICA was due to the fact non-Malay enterprises and businesses were not creating a 
favourable climate for Malays for sufficiently fast economic advancement, in 
accordance to the principles set out under the NEP. Furthermore, it was also 
assumed that state intervention in the economy in order to keep the non-Malay 
private sector in check was necessary, so that Malays could advance themselves 
economically with special privileges, not only in terms of employment equity 
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(especially in the public service), but also in business and tertiary education which is 
fundamental to upward social mobility. However, because domestic Chinese capital 
was marginalised, the state was largely dependent on FDI and joint ownerships in 
order to realise the industrial program (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:44). This was 
largely beneficial to the ruling party (UMNO) because class action at the time was 
uncoordinated due to the fact that the majority of the middle class was satisfied with 
the benefits they reaped from government policies.   
Although preferential ethnic policies beneficial to the Malays under the NEP 
were implemented in business and in bureaucratic employment, much of the NEP’s 
success can be credited to the education system. Affirmative action policies on 
employment and tertiary education allowed the Malays to better their lives and social 
status. Therefore, their improved lifestyles are a direct result of affirmative action 
policies passed by the dominant UMNO government. Furthermore, the ability of 
UMNO to court the Malay middle class suppressed any desire for political freedom 
which would match their economic power (Torii, 2003:232). Moreover, because the 
state-domestic-capital-alliance was present, it allowed for patronage and clientelistic 
tendencies to run rampant amongst the Malay elite who blurred the lines between 
the private and public spheres.  
This chapter has illustrated how the UMNO- dominated state deliberately 
implemented policies like NEP, which were directed at addressing the Malay 
dilemma, and in so doing grew the Malay middle and business classes. These 
classes were consciously shaped by the ruling party27 (UMNO) as the ANC has done 
with the emerging black middle class in South Africa through the state ideology of 
the NDR. The Malay middle class that emerged under policies passed by the UMNO 
                                                          
27
 Dominated by the Malay  ‘administocrats’. 
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government is likely to reinforce UMNO’s dominance in a context where politics is 
aligned along ethnic lines. Because UMNO is sympathetic to Malay interests, the 
Malay middle classes’ democratic role is somewhat softened because the middle 
class is not likely to bite the hand that feeds it. At this stage, this study proposes that 
the new black middle class is more inclined to endorse the ANC’s hegemonic 
tendencies in government; although many might express dissent from within the 
party ranks regarding the furthering of the process of democratic consolidation. The 
next chapter of this dissertation will look at the South African dominant party system 
under the ANC, and those findings will then be juxtaposed with the Malaysian case 
study (from the period of independence up until 1990) in order to highlight similarities 
and differences. More importantly, the following chapter of this thesis will dissect the 
South African case, with reference to single-party dominance, ethnic politics and the 
composition of the bureaucracy. Once this has been done, inferences can be made 
about the black middle class in contemporary South Africa based on its origins, size 
and ideological standing.  
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Chapter 4: The ANC and the black 
middle class: Balancing democracy 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) is the oldest liberation movement in South 
Africa; founded by an African middle class of teachers, ministers, doctors and 
lawyers. It is contended that the ANC itself is profoundly influenced by the ideology 
of communism as well as having a fundamentally Africanist outlook in terms of its 
stance; however, the ruling party is currently engaged in staying committed to the 
values and principles it was founded on while accommodating the different values of 
those who want political power in order to underwrite personal interests (De Jager & 
Du Toit, 2013:149). As with many dominant party political systems throughout the 
developing world, the nature of the current democratic regime in South Africa is 
deeply entrenched within the country’s history of racial segregation known as 
apartheid. However, this thesis does not posit that party dominance is linked to racial 
segregation universally. However, it is necessary to highlight South Africa’s 
apartheid past as a fundamental factor when assessing the impact of today’s black 
middle class on South Africa’s fledgling democracy. This chapter will draw parallels 
to the Malaysian case with reference to how the UMNO immediately embarked on 
the goal of achieving economic transformation like the Malays’ after independence, 
compared to the ANC (predominantly) that had to struggle against the apartheid 
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regime after initially being repressed under colonial British rule as well. Here, one 
must note that South Africa’s shift towards inclusive democracy was forced and 
certainly not due to socio-economic maturity 28  as advocated by modernisation 
theory. In essence, the UMNO was afforded the chance of redressing economic 
imbalances straight after independence, whereas South Africa’s post-colonial period 
was followed by four decades of regulation under the apartheid regime (Mandla, 
2006:40). More importantly, this chapter will discuss the nature of the South African 
polity in terms of its dominant party system, how the black class was grown by the 
current ruling party by means of various policies, and illustrate that the democratic 
impact of the black middle class is severely diminished under certain conditions of a) 
a dominant party political system, b) ethnic politics, c) the composition of the 
bureaucracy, and d) the absence of an alliance between the state and private 
capital.  The first two factors discussed in the theoretical framework of this study, 
namely one-party dominance and the role of ethnic politics, have a knock-on effect 
on the type of bureaucracy arranged by government and feeds into the nature of the 
relationship between the state and private capital. 
Similar to Malaysia, South Africa was colonised by the British up until 1910, 
where independence was won from the British which then yielded a power-sharing 
(between the British and Afrikaner) government known as the Union of South Africa. 
Interestingly, at the turn of the century, the Afrikaners, like their Malay counterparts, 
were poor, destitute and did not possess the necessary skills to prosper in a British-
dominated laissez-faire economy (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:47). However, in 1948 
                                                          
28
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a very strong causal relationship between economic development and 
democracy, because economic development brings with it greater economic security (increased income) and 
widespread higher education; hence social and economic security tends to lead to political equality as well. But 
in South Africa, democracy was primarily forced due to the country’s international isolation, widespread 
political violence and the fact that the ANC and NP had reached a stalemate in terms of implementing 
unilateral conflict resolution strategies.   
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the National Party (NP) won power and became the dominant party under the 
ideology of apartheid (introduced in 1948) later on in the mid-1960’s (Giliomee, 
1998:1). Apartheid essentially  was a more intensified, systemically fluid and 
institutionalised racial authoritarianism, which was ushered in by the NP government 
in order to strategically repress and control black people from taking part in South 
Africa’s economy. But, the repression and denial of political rights to non-whites 
started in 1910 where Blacks were denied the right to vote, and Coloureds and 
Indians were afforded very limited franchise. Legislation such as the Land Acts of 
1913 and 1936, the Native Town Areas Act of the 1920’s, the 1920’s ‘Civilised 
Labour Policy’ as well as the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 were the cornerstone 
underwriting white segregationism and supremacist which was refined by the 
Apartheid state post 1948. This would in later years have severe repercussions on 
the socio-economic standings of the oppressed people in South Africa.  
Similar to the state intervention in the economy practised by the UMNO 
government in Malaysia after coming into power, the NP government in South Africa 
fostered the advancement of the Afrikaner through state-created corporations (Van 
der Westhuizen, 2002:54). However, some of the state-created corporations had 
existed before the NP was in charge of political office (prior to 1948)‒like ISCOR 
(Iron and Steel Corporation) and the IDC (Industrial Development Corporation)‒but 
the NP government ensured the growth of countless state corporations under their 
rule. For instance, no less than 22 public corporations were established, like 
ARMSCOR (dominant armaments manufacturer both domestically and 
internationally), ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission) which is the largest 
supplier of electricity throughout southern Africa, NUFKOR (uranium enrichment) 
and SASOL which produces petrol and plays a fundamental role in the 
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petrochemical industry (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:54). These were important 
enterprises because they created a secondary industry, hence making South Africa 
less dependent on the gold-mining sector and attracting private investment within the 
new industries. This indicated, as in Malaysia under the NEP, that the overall share 
of the public sector in the economy under NP governance was on the increase. 
Furthermore, under the principles of the apartheid ideology, discriminatory laws were 
passed in order to safeguard Whites within the polity from competition on all fronts: 
the bureaucracy was enlarged in order to provide Afrikaners with employment 
opportunities; also, many Afrikaner financial capitalists, farmers and workers were 
granted bloated direct and indirect donations (aid) in the years 1948-1958 (Mandla, 
2006:39).  
The early years of apartheid implementation saw many strict, rigid laws 
enforced in order to repress and restrain Blacks as mentioned previously. Taking into 
account the theory of modernisation discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, these strict 
laws did not bode well for the black middle business class. For instance, The Group 
Areas Act of 1950 strictly restricted black ownership of firms within certain specific 
urban areas (cities and towns); in addition, further amendments stipulated that black 
entrepreneurs could not own multiple (more than one) businesses, nor could they 
establish partnerships or companies (Mandla, 2006:40). Furthermore, black firms 
could only trade in markets of retail food supply and fuel. However, black people 
were afforded the opportunity of finding employment in the corporate sector despite 
the apartheid policies implemented to restrain this, mainly due to the fact that the 
apartheid government relaxed influx control measures. Prior to these reforms being 
instituted, the black middle stratum was deliberately stunted by the apartheid 
government simply because this class was seen as the greatest potential threat in 
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competition with white accumulation. The mentioned reforms were introduced due to 
the economic stagnation of the 1970s-1980 in South Africa; which created the crisis 
that forced the government to make reforms which would open up prospects for the 
progression of black business and entrepreneurs (Mandla, 2006:40). The two 
pertinent factors that forced these reforms on the apartheid government were that 
the white share of the population shrank from 20% in 1960 to 15% in the mid-1980s, 
as well as the crisis of domestic capitalism exacerbated by the armed struggle and 
international sanctions29. At the time when these reforms were implemented, the 
black middle class was very small, “where less than 1% of employed black people 
were owners and managers, and only 5% of Blacks had an annual income of more 
than R16 000 in 1985” (Giliomee & Simkins, 1998). In turn, once investor confidence 
dropped, it resulted in gross fixed investment declining from 26% of GDP in 1983 to 
16% in 1991; at this rate it was impossible for South Africa to grow (Giliomee, 
1998:2).  
Before the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa’s transition from 
racial authoritarianism toward inclusive democracy in the 1990s was accomplished 
by the NP and the ANC. This resulted in the first non-racial elections in 1994, which 
saw the ANC win 62% of the vote30; thus setting the platform for a Government of 
National Unity (GNU), which was a coalition government meant to rule for five years 
under an interim constitution (Giliomee, 1998:4). The GNU was to operate within a 
liberal democratic framework which still left international and domestic white capital 
with economic power. However, the NP left the GNU in 1996, which left the ANC at 
the helm of a dominant party regime.  
                                                          
29
 The armed struggle was spearheaded by the ANC and the PAC, commencing  from 1961. 
30
 The 1994 elections saw the ANC government enter the GNU with 62% of the vote, the NP with 20% of the 
vote and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with 10%. 
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After acquiring political office in 1994, the ANC government inherited a past 
plagued by widespread racial oppression, economic mismanagement, vast inequality 
and poverty, as well as a bureaucracy that was not only expensive to maintain but 
also ineffective. Therefore, Mandela and the ANC were faced with the daunting task 
of reconciling a shattered society and redressing the imbalances of the past (Mandla, 
2006:41). In addition, the ANC’s acquisition of political office in 1994 was further 
problematised by the fact that capitalism had become hegemonic throughout the 
global order (globalisation), as well as the fact that the Soviet Union had collapsed, 
which would put further restrictions on the ANC. Therefore, in an effort to try and 
replicate the efforts of the UMNO government in Malaysia31 where UMNO took on a 
state interventionist approach to address the Malay dilemma, the ANC also had to 
restructure South Africa’s economy in a manner that would benefit the previously 
disadvantaged Blacks, who had been marginalised in South Africa’s formal economy 
during apartheid. In addition to transforming the state institutions and the economy, 
the ANC would also have the twin objectives of ensuring the delivery of basic 
services to the previously oppressed citizenry (and to the citizens of the polity at 
large), as well as consolidating its control of the state as a liberation movement 
turned political party. Therefore, it is important to first discuss the state ideology of 
the ANC, which is indicative of how the ANC would go about achieving the 
abovementioned goals and objectives.  
 
  
                                                          
31
 According to Giliomee (1998:6), the ANC was inspired to produce economic transformation that was 
equivalent to their assumption of political power, similar to the success achieved by the UMNO in Malaysia. 
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4.1.1 The ANC’s State Ideology: National Democratic Revolution (NDR) 
 
The ANC’s NDR can be viewed as the overarching ideology guiding the ruling party 
to achieve said goals under the new democratic regime. In essence, the NDR is a 
national project of transformation32 through capturing the state (De Jager & Du Toit, 
2013). This ideology advocates a great need for state intervention in all spheres of 
the polity, like state institutions, business sectors (economy), civil society and within 
academia in order to redress the consequences of apartheid. The NDR aims to 
transform South Africa into a democratic society, and is heavily influenced by the 
ruling party’s liberation credentials. The ANC largely views itself as the ‘vanguard’ of 
the revolution, and hence does not take well to criticism, as will be shown later in this 
chapter (De Jager, 2009:281). The three main strategies of the NDR which impact 
on the South African polity in all spheres are i) heavy state intervention, ii) a 
centralised system of government where all key decisions are made by a core elite, 
iii) and cadre deployment which allows for ANC cadres to be strategically placed in 
state institutions, civil society and in business (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013).  
This national transformation project seeks to achieve ideological hegemony 
throughout all spheres of government and society at large, by virtue of cadre 
deployment. As will be explained later, this strategy of cadre deployment has been 
viewed as undemocratic because it allows the ruling party to fill the civil service with 
its members, who are bound by party loyalty and discipline. The thinking behind the 
NDR is that once the ANC has consolidated its control of state power, it can then 
embark on transforming state machinery to oblige the cause of social change (De 
                                                          
32
 The term transformation refers to a programme of achieving demographic representativeness within all 
spheres of government and society, motivated by the past’s injustices. 
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Jager, 2009:282). Below is a diagram which encapsulates the NDR and how it will be 
implemented:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: De Jager (2009:283). 
 
The next section of this chapter will deal with South Africa’s dominant party political 
system (with the ANC at the helm), which not only allowed the ANC to grow a black 
middle class, but also is an important factor when analysing the democratic impact of 
the black middle class in contemporary South Africa.  
Figure 1: The ANC's NDR and Cadre 
Deployment Strategy 
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4.2 Dominant Party Political System 
 
Dominant party regimes often do not fulfil the requirements of a liberal democracy, 
but at the same time satisfy democratic criteria within procedural terms33 (De Jager & 
Du Toit, 2013:7). However, it is fundamental to understand how dominant parties 
flourish within dominant party systems in the global periphery. In South Africa’s case, 
the ANC has not lost a single national election since democracy was instituted in 
1994. The ruling party is profoundly influenced by three ideologies which are 
interwoven into the fabric of the institution namely, Christian liberalism, African 
nationalism and Communism and non-racialism (De Jager, 2009:276). These three 
ideological influences are indicative of the internal pluralism or factions within the 
ruling party, as well as the ANC’s widespread support base which is a fundamental 
factor in the party’s success in maintaining its dominance through policy and action. 
 The ANC characteristically (with reference to dominant parties that were once 
liberation movements) still displays clear signs of their liberation legacy now that they 
are the dominant political party in South Africa. For instance, the ANC is “less willing 
to disperse power from its centre, is [‘semi’] repressive and unaccountable, shows a 
strong tendency to abuse state patronage, and questions the very legitimacy of 
opposition parties within the democratic regime” (Giliomee, 1998:2). In addition, the 
ANC as a former liberation movement has adopted a highly centralised and 
somewhat authoritarian political culture within the party structures, which then 
influences the manner in which the ruling party governs post-liberation. The ANC 
government has centralised power through strategies like deploying ANC cadres to 
                                                          
33
 These types of political systems have free and fair elections, have a multitude of political parties engaging in 
the process, but yield only one dominant party that directs the political system (for a long period) without the 
opposition denting their political hegemony. In addition, these political systems have not yet experienced an 
alternation in power which is fundamental for liberal democracy. 
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specific political positions (which will be discussed later in this chapter), as well as 
through legislative and policy proposals that aim to strip local municipalities and 
provincial governments from power pertaining to issues of state security, policy 
planning functions and revenue distribution (Democratic Alliance, 2010:2). The latter 
fields will be controlled by the national government.  Here, it is important to note that 
South Africa also has a history of one-party dominance. For instance, the NP 
government under apartheid was also one-party dominant, and illustrated the same 
tendency to the centralisation of power in order to restructure the economy at the 
time to benefit Afrikaners.  
De Jager and Du Toit (2013:151) stipulate that South Africa’s liberation history 
has resulted into a “centralised political system (institutional centralisation)”, as well 
as the ruling party (ANC) being viewed as the voice of the new South Africa 
(dispositional centralisation). Therefore, when the ruling party has been faced with 
crises regarding unaccountability or criticism from opposition parties within the 
political system, the ANC has the tendency of labelling any naysayers as being “anti-
transformation” or “anti-revolutionary” in an attempt to delegitimise said claims. 
Examples of the aforementioned can clearly be seen in the controversy between the 
executive and the judiciary, where the latter institutions were accused of 
consolidating opposition to the government (ANC) (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013:151). 
Furthermore, there is a disregard for institutional measures like the separation of 
powers or the Constitution, by members of the ANC working in government. For 
instance, in the National Assembly the ANC tried to and ensured that the motion of 
No Confidence tabled against President Jacob Zuma by opposition parties was 
blocked. Furthermore, Max Sisulu (ANC member) acting as the Speaker of 
Parliament ignored his institutional mandate of being impartial to debates of the 
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house and sided with the ANC by blocking the motion (Mahlangu, 2012). The actions 
of Sisulu encroached on the constitutional right of the opposition to debate their 
motion in Parliament. These aforementioned institutional measures are in place to 
ensure state officials’ honesty and accountability to the electorate, within a system of 
government where there is a periodic change of power (Giliomee, 1998:3). These 
state officials as members of the dominant party are less fearful of losing elections 
because of their party’s consolidation of political power within the polity.  
Additionally, South Africa’s corporatist structure has aided the dominant party 
in its effort of strengthening its hold on state power, because The National Economic 
Development and Labour Advisory Council (NEDLAC) serves as an industrial-
relations forum where business and organised labour can engage one another 
(Giliomee, 1998:7). One could argue that this forum was created to appease the 
socialist strand (COSATU) within the tripartite alliance, because a strategy of 
achieving growth and redistribution is not really evident34. At the same time, big 
business understands that the ANC is the only political party that can maintain 
political stability within the country, while remaining committed to neo-liberal 
macroeconomic policies. The ANC on the other hand, is very aware of the fact that 
the support of unionised labour (COSATU) is vital in terms of achieving not only 
national consensus and social stability, but is also fundamental to the party 
deepening its dominance within the polity (Giliomee, 1998:7). One must also keep in 
mind that the SACP and the COSATU gave its support to the tripartite alliance on the 
basic condition that the ANC implement a national policy premised on social welfare 
and job creation. 
                                                          
34
 The NEDLAC has failed to address unemployment in South Africa which is one of the crises inherited by the 
new dispensation after assuming political power. 
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This has been a brief indication as to how the dominant party political system 
has manifested in South Africa.The following section will deal with ethnic politics 
which ties in very well with the latter. 
4.2.1 Ethnic Politics 
 
Ethnic politics is the second factor used in the theoretical framework of this study, 
and is important because South Africa’s racial past has produced this type of political 
behaviour that mutually reinforces the dominance of the ANC in the political arena. 
One of the negative legacies of South Africa’s racial history (and biggest challenges 
posed to the ANC government), are the extremely high levels of poverty and vast 
economic inequalities amongst respective races and classes. Therefore, as 
expected, South Africa is ethnically divided, which has resulted in a highly polarised 
electorate (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013:151). This has resulted in the ANC 
commanding electoral dominance, and is further compounded by the absence of a 
credible opposition, thereby reinforcing  the cycle of voting along racial identity35. In 
turn, this reinforces the dominance of the ANC because the black majority view the 
party as their ‘liberators’. According to the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
(EISA), a random sample survey conducted after the 1994 elections, showed that 
75,2% of Blacks voted for the ANC36 compared to 0.8% of Whites, and 48.3% of 
Whites voted for the NP (Brooks, 2004:5). These figures were further galvanised in 
                                                          
35
 The ANC is seen as the party that represents the black majority within South Africa, and therefore has forced 
those who do not identify with the dominant party to withdraw from the democratic process. 
36
 In 1999, the ANC managed to acquire 66% of the vote in the 1999 national election, which proved pivotal as 
this was deemed the point where the ANC consolidated their support and power. 
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the 1999 election which was widely viewed as the ANC’s ‘consolidation election’, but 
more importantly 1999 also witnessed the weakening of parliament37.  
The 2004 elections were a turning point with reference to the professionalism 
of the electoral commission, civil society and the political parties in terms of ensuring 
that the elections were a success, as well as signifying that democracy was 
entrenched; it was also indicative as to how democracy could be galvanised (Brooks, 
2004:6). More importantly, what stood out from the 2004 elections (although 
convincingly won by Mbeki’s ANC), was the rise of the Democratic Alliance (DA)38 
which is the official opposition to the dominant ANC today. In the 2004 elections, the 
DA won 12.3% of the vote which was a 3% increase from 1999; however, the ANC 
still managed to secure 69.6% of votes which was once again indicative of the 
dominant party’s hold over the national agenda (Brooks, 2004:6).  
Throughout the first three national elections it was evident that the ANC 
commanded the political arena mainly because of the historical role of the ruling 
party in South Africa. The ANC was able to extend its appeal as a ‘catch all’ political 
party; hence expanding its support base across different groups in society which 
allowed it to have all differing voices spanning the ideological continuum under its 
banner. For instance, the tripartite alliance has brought labour and business/capital 
around one table. The tripartite alliance consisting of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC 
endures a very balanced relationship which enables the ANC to attract the votes of 
communists, trade union members (workers), urban and rural poor, as well as the 
                                                          
37
 The parliament was weakened in the sense that between 1994 and 1999, opposition parties vying against 
the ANC lost a considerable number of seats in the National Assembly, but during this period the number of 
opposition parties had almost doubled. 
38
 The DA was formerly known as the Democratic Party (DP) during the 1999 election under the rule of Tony 
Leon, but had revamped itself in order to strengthen its challenge to the ANC. 
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emergent middle class (Brooks, 2004:7). However, it will later be revealed that 
although the ANC has had a historical link to the political left with reference to the 
role played by COSATU during the struggle years, its influence on the ANC 
government’s policy trajectory has slowly declined since the 1990s 39 . It can be 
argued that the influence of the SACP and COSATU on the ANC within the tripartite 
alliance, dwindles when the ruling party is feeling confident or assured; but in times 
when the chips are down, their value and impact increase (Cuthbertson, 2008:295).  
The Polokwane National Conference in 2007 illustrated how the ANC’s 
internal pluralism could be detrimental to the organisation, as factions within the 
ruling party and tripartite alliance revealed themselves in the ousting of Mbeki as 
party president, bringing current state president Zuma into the picture. The following 
section will illustrate to the reader how ethnic politics reinforces the political 
dominance of the ANC in South Africa. 
 
4.2.2 Strengthening the hold on State Power: ANC dominance reinforced by 
ethnic politics 
 
South Africa’s dominant party political system to a certain extent allows for the ruling 
party to ignore the criticism stemming from opposition parties40, which then highlights 
the issue around the manner in which the dominant party will further entrench and 
continue its dominance. For instance, compared to democratic political systems 
where legitimacy is largely premised on government delivering in instrumental 
                                                          
39
 The ANC government has veered away from leftist economic policies and conformed to the global 
hegemonic economic orthodoxy of neo-liberalism. 
40
 This would not be possible in a democratic system where respective parties compete at length with one 
another for the support of the electorate, as well as having a greater influence through policy alternatives. 
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terms41, the ANC in South Africa is granted political legitimacy largely based on the 
party’s liberation credentials (Brooks, 2004:8). With this being said, despite the 
manner in which government has performed and the choices it has made with regard 
to policy decisions, added to the fact that the government’s transformation project 
(National Democratic Revolution [NDR]) has not materialised, plus vast socio-
economic inequalities across the country, the ANC still remains the dominant political 
institution throughout the polity. Therefore, South Africans vote along ethnic lines 
despite the lack of performance by the ANC in key areas that would enhance the 
quality of democracy in South Africa. This lack of performance is usually signified by 
the frequent service delivery protests that plague informal settlements across the 
country. The citizenry is often upset about not receiving adequate services which is 
then compounded by rumours of government officials involved in corruption and 
economic mismanagement. Instead of voting in opposition parties to govern local 
municipalities, residents take to the streets in violent protests where state property is 
often damaged.  
This latter point lends itself to understanding the role played by opposition 
parties in dominant party political systems like South Africa, because according to 
Reddy (2002:3) “the scope of opposition politics is undoubtedly narrowed and limited 
to relating to the dominant party”. A clear example of this in South Africa is when the 
opposition premises their campaigns based on the ANC’s government failure to 
deliver goods and services to the electorate: like job creation, poverty alleviation, 
land policy and managing the impact of HIV/AIDS. In this sense, opposition parties 
have not been able to produce party manifestos that are significantly different to that 
of the ruling party (Brooks, 2004:10). This then reinforces and replicates the cycle of 
                                                          
41
 The ability of the government in power to deliver goods and services to the electorate in return for their 
support at the polls 
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voting along ethnic lines in South Africa, because most of the stronger political 
parties do not stray too far away from the ‘centre’42 in terms of ideology on the 
political spectrum. Furthermore, with the absence of class-based politics in South 
Africa it means that political affiliation is largely based on historical ties to respective 
political parties. Another historical flaw or chink in the armour of political opposition in 
South Africa is that instead of competing with the ANC for the African vote more 
rigorously, opposition parties have the tendency of appealing to groups which are 
viewed as outside of the ANC’s scope like the Whites, Coloured and Indian 
communities (Brooks, 2004:11). One must also keep in mind that apart from white 
business/capital43, the ANC does not really need the vote of the white minority to 
retain its dominance.  
After the ANC charged itself with transforming the South African polity by 
means of the NDR, the dominant party views any political party or organisation that 
opposes or criticises it as being anti-transformation44 as stated earlier (De Jager, 
2009:281).  It is as if debating on the NDR is totally out of the question from an ANC 
standpoint. Even the media has come under ANC scrutiny, although this sector 
should be totally independent in a liberal democratic regime. For instance, in 
conference resolutions at the fifty-second gathering of the ANC, documents specified 
that “some fractions of the media continue to adopt an anti-transformation, anti-ANC 
stance” with reference to the ruling party’s NDR. The ruling party believes that 
national broadcasters like the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is an 
                                                          
42
 Most of the political parties in South Africa take a common approach to issues of macro-economic policy 
(advocating economic growth through investment), therefore they portray themselves as being broadly 
centrist.  
43
 It can be argued that white business believes that the ANC is the only political party that is able  in terms of 
containing the majority vote, while implementing a neoliberal program in South Africa (Brooks, 2004:11). 
44
 These institutions regarded as ‘anti-transformation’ with regard to the democratic revolution, thus become 
known as illegitimate. Often opposition parties and interest groups or organisations from civil society are 
branded as racist when opposing the ANC’s hegemonic project. 
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integral and fundamental role player in the NDR, in terms of creating and portraying 
positive images of a new democratic dispensation (De Jager, 2009:281). In addition, 
current ANC and State president Jacob Zuma stated that “[critical media was 
controlled by] particular class interests,  predominantly whites” (De Jager, 2009:281). 
Therefore, the ANC uses South Africa’s turbulent history to its advantage to taint 
criticism coming from historically white institutions, as being motivated along lines of 
racism, nostalgic for the apartheid regime that produced them. This strategy then 
affords the ruling party the means to undermine or disregard legitimate claims from 
opposition that are meant to provide checks and balances on the ANC’s power.  
The latter point becomes problematic for democratic consolidation, because 
the ANC (with the power at its disposal) continues to centralise its power over state 
institutions, under the guise of the NDR’s transformation of the state (De Jager, 
2009:282). However, there are members within the ANC who respect the need for 
strong opposition and alternate ideas that stem from different organisations in civil 
society. The next section of this chapter will look at how the ANC grew the black 
middle class by virtue of the NDR and the cadre deployment strategy. The black 
middle class is specifically highlighted in this next section, because this study 
conceptualises middle class according to occupation. Therefore, the ANC’s cadre 
deployment strategy put cadres in middle class occupations across different spheres 
of government and society like business, state institutions (bureaucracy) and civil 
society. The next section will start off by briefly looking at the black middle class 
before 1994, and then go on to discuss how the black middle class was grown via 
the NDR and cadre deployment. 
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4.3 The ANC and the Black Middle Class    
4.3.1 The Black Middle Class before Democracy in South Africa  
    
As stated earlier in this chapter, the development of the black middle class was 
intentionally inhibited by the apartheid regime before 1994. It is necessary to touch 
on the black middle class before the inauguration of democracy in South Africa, 
because it has great historical links to the ruling party which highlights the paramount 
role it played in overthrowing the apartheid regime, as well as the post-revolutionary 
role it has assumed by virtue of the NDR. The black middle class was mobilised 
during the struggle years to aid liberation movements like the ANC to overthrow the 
apartheid regime, but post-1994 the black middle class has become an instrument of 
the ruling party in terms of solidifying dominance, as well as the direct outcome of 
ANC policies with reference to the growth and modernisation of South Africa’s 
economy (Southall, 2004a:3). 
According to Nzimande (1990:74), the consolidation of capitalism and the 
ideology of apartheid as a system of governance in the early 1960s, impacted on   
and altered the very composition of the African petty bourgeoisie. There were four 
distinct groupings of the African middle class: the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, the 
trading petty bourgeoisie, the civil petty bourgeoisie and the corporate petty 
bourgeoisie (Southall, 2004a, 5). The African middle class, according to Nzimande, 
was made up by strata from rural, urban, townships and the Bantustans and differed 
from one another in terms of where people worked and the positions they occupied. 
For instance, the trading petty middle class were mainly traders who trading in the 
Bantustans (either rural or urban), and the civil petty middle class consisted of civil 
servants of the apartheid central administration and Bantustans (nurses, teachers 
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and clerks). The corporate petty middle class only emerged from the 1970s after the 
reforms and amendments to apartheid state policies, and were very supportive of 
‘deracialised capitalism’ where they would challenge the practise of managerial 
racism (Southall, 2004a :5). Although the literature collectively concludes that the 
African middle class in South Africa grew extensively in the years from 1960 to 1970, 
there is much contestation among scholars as to the most accurate estimate 
reflecting the group as a whole. For instance, although these scholars advocate that 
the growth of the African middle class due to the “upward mobility of blacks into 
clerical, technical and non-manual occupations and of Africans into skilled 
employment” (Simkins & Hindson, 1979), Nolutshungu (1982) estimates the size of 
this class as being around 122 000 in 1970, compared to Wolpe’s estimate of the 
class being around 1 315 000 in 197445 (Southall, 2004a 5). Furthermore, another 
factor which accounts for the advancement of Africans into the middle classes, was 
the so-called ‘floating colour bar’ whereby Africans’ upward occupational mobility 
was due to Whites moving up into more skilled and higher income occupations 
(Southall, 2004a: 5). It must be kept in mind that the black middle class in the early 
1990s was extremely small. 
4.3.2 The Black Middle Class after 1994 
 
When the ANC took political office in 1994 it was faced with soaring levels of poverty 
and inequality, hence the urgency from the ANC on embarking on a national project 
of transformation in order to redress the social-economic injustices of South Africa’s 
past. Literature on dominant political party systems indicates that the majority 
coalition of socio-economic blocs is often favoured by dominant parties in industrial 
                                                          
45
 The reason for this differentiation in figures boils down to the methodology and definitions utilized by the 
respective scholars when doing their studies, as well as the fact that statistics for employment could not be 
deciphered into certain categories for the use of class theories.  
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(more developed) democracies; however in the developing world (countries like 
South Africa) a dominant party like the ANC is expected to exercise greater state 
intervention in the economy in order to achieve redistribution of material resources to 
its citizenry (Giliomee, 1998:6). Most people who voted the ANC into power after 
democracy had been instituted, entertained aspirations to middle class lifestyles and 
expected that the black majority government would deliver that promise to them 
(Giliomee & Simkins, 1998).  
In a pre-1994 election poll, 81% of blacks said that they expect the new 
government to make sure that ‘people like me can live like most whites’. In 
another investigation, two-thirds of a sample of black youth indicated that they 
felt they could get a university degree and wanted the government to make 
this possible. (Giliomee & Simkins, 1998) 
Like the UMNO in Malaysia, the ANC was determined to replicate 46  or at most 
achieve similar success in economic transformation, which would reflect the 
assumption of political power by the black majority political party like UMNO did in 
Malaysia. What was paramount to the ANC’s assumption of political office in 1994 
was essentially a project of capturing the state which would afford the ANC leeway in 
terms of extension of state intervention in economic life, as mentioned earlier (De 
Jager & Du Toit, 2013:157). This policy known as the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP), stipulated the nationalisation of specific sectors of the 
economy and redistributing wealth from the privileged to previously disadvantaged 
Blacks under the new dispensation (Giliomee & Simkins, 1998).  
                                                          
46
 The UMNO was successful in “advancing the Malay managerial class, boosting Malay equity holdings and 
narrowing Chinese-Malay economic inequalities” (Giliomee, 1998:6).  UMNO had also managed to achieve 
these successes of growth and redistribution while keeping unemployment down to below single digits during 
the relevant period. 
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The NDR’s strategic objective, according to the ruling party, was to create a 
“non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society”. However, this could only be 
achieved by placing the emphasis on liberating Africans (Blacks in general) from 
political and economic oppression (De Jager, 2009:282). Hence, the strengthening of 
the hold of the democratic government on state power, and transmuting the 
machinery of the state in order to serve social change was fundamental. According 
to De Jager (2009:282), this transformation would be embodied once all institutions 
within society (public and private), reflected the racial demographic of the South 
African society 47 . This policy of transformation is clearly indicative of the 
centralisation of power within the dominant party over all spheres of government48, 
whereby the South African society would be transformed via political power.  
The ANC’s policy of democratic centrism illustrated above, created a situation 
where de jure authority resides primarily in the Constitution, Parliament and the 
presidential Cabinet, however the de facto authority within the polity is held by the 
ANC itself (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013: ch 8). The following section will look at how 
the ANC implemented the NDR in business and state institutions through their cadre 
deployment strategy. The implementation of the NDR ideology in business and the 
civil service is fundamental to the role of the black middle class which needs to 
maintain its loyalty to the ruling party. Therefore, it is important to look at affirmative 
action policies like BEE and BBBEE within the context of business, as well as 
looking at the composition of the bureaucracy. Essentially one can look at BEE as a 
policy instrument that endeavoured to create a black corporate bourgeoisie 
(professionals), compared to cadre deployment within the civil service where ANC 
                                                          
47
 The NDR therefore refers to a policy of racial representativeness, where the classification of race and 
strategic discrimination premised on race was then justified within the constructs of ‘Africanism’ (De Jager, 
2009:282). 
48
 The bureaucracy, judiciary, government parastatals, the police service and army, central bank and the media. 
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members would hold posts as legislators, state managers, officials and clerks. The 
affirmative action policy of BEE will be discussed first. 
4.4 The NDR and Business 
4.4.1 Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
 
 Like the special privileges set out under the UMNO’s NEP economic policy 
framework, BEE policies and initiatives were always regarded as important within the 
ruling party. According to Ramaphosa (2004:74), due to the depth of economic 
disempowerment which had been perpetuated for decades, wide-reaching 
empowerment initiatives are essential in terms of reversing or redressing these 
ethnic inequalities amongst the populace. In addition, after the BEE process was 
initiated under the ANC government’s regime, black empowerment in democratic 
South Africa has evolved through three distinct periods. As stipulated by Mandla 
(2006:43), the first two periods or waves of BEE were characterised by the various 
obstacles and hurdles that had accrued in the process of empowering previously 
disadvantaged Blacks who had to deal with harsh market conditions which are 
mentioned below. In view of the failure of first two periods, the third period of BEE49 
was specifically intended at extending and broadening the scope of economic 
empowerment to a vast majority of black people in South Africa. .  
When the ‘Washington Consensus’ as a policy prescription for development 
(ushered in by Reagan and Thatcher’s conservative economic policies) was incepted 
by international financial institutions50, economic liberalisation, fiscal conservatism, 
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 This third wave of BEE is referred to as Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). 
50
 International institutions refer to the IMF and the World Bank. 
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privatisation and a reduced role of the state in the economy were prerequisites for 
developing nations in the global periphery (Butler,n.d.:5). However, the birth of the 
BEE policy under the ANC government was poorly thought out, and can at best be 
described as a policy that looked to appease white capital, the political left in terms 
of organised labour (COSATU), and aspiring black entrepreneurs after the 
inauguration of the democratic government (Tangri & Southall, 2008:702). On the 
one hand, the ANC government has been vocal toward capital in terms of 
transforming to achieve black empowerment, but on the other hand it has also 
advocated a cause for a less stringent empowerment regime to allow for foreign 
private investment. Evidently, these conflicting stances are two sides of the same 
coin. This latter point is reinforced by Gelb (2005:369), who asserts that white 
capital/business played a big role in political transition, and that an “implicit bargain” 
was struck between white business and the ANC. This bargain resulted in the ruling 
party committing itself to orthodox economic policy while white business would 
reform white businesses and open up ownership and management to black people. 
Therefore, the BEE policy was not only constrained by poor planning and unrealistic 
goal-setting, but severely inhibited by the global market forces and the hegemony of 
neo-liberal economic orthodoxy at the time. 
4.4.1.1 The first and second waves of BEE (1994-2002) 
 
The first and second periods of BEE were characterised by deracialising the state, 
taking control of state parastatals and institutions, an employment equity policy and 
promoting the development of small and medium sized black businesses (Butler, 
n.d.:4). Mandla (2006:43) states that BEE was fixated on granting black 
entrepreneurs ownership in white corporations, by giving certain BEE groups or 
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conglomerates shares in these companies. The thinking behind this initiative was 
that this share ownership in big corporations would then have a trickle-down effect, 
hence affecting the black masses positively. The effects of this process resulted in 
companies like Sanlam selling 10% of its controlling stake in Metropolitan Life to 
black investors; this deal resulted in the establishment of New Africa Investments 
(NAIL)51 and Real Africa Investments (RAIL) (Mandla, 2006:43).  
According to Van der Westhuizen (2002:136), by 1994 there were 8 black-led 
companies listed on the JSE, 11 by 1995 and 17 by the end of 1996. Furthermore, 
by 1998 there were 53 black companies totalling a market capitalisation of R111 
billion in comparison to around R57 billion held by 33 black companies in 1996. An 
instrument utilised to facilitate the transfer of shares, were special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) used by financial institutions to aid the purchasing of equity in target 
companies. Furthermore, these shares purchased were then used as collateral 
against loans, but served to expose the unstable nature of BEE deals in the face of 
economic crises (Butler, n.d.:5). Seal (1998:82) asserts that these BEE deals were 
just investment groups that were claiming small equity stakes in established 
companies, and that not a single black-led company was sustainable in terms of 
contributing to the economy, improving skills amongst the populace or significantly 
creating jobs. The latter point is exactly what led to the drastic reduction of black 
ownership on the JSE, due to the 1998 financial crash which saw the black JSE 
market capitalisation plummet from 7% to 2% (Beall, Gelb and Hassim, 2005:693).  
In the light of this, BEE being implemented across the broader private sector 
was somewhat delayed, and many black entrepreneurs regarded the private sector 
                                                          
51
 NAIL became the first BEE Company that listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) in August 
1994 (Van der Westhuizen, 2002:134). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
as hostile (Butler, n.d.:4). However, a fundamental flaw in the manner in which the 
BEE policy was being carried out, was that these aforementioned deals only 
benefitted Blacks who had certain skills or those politically connected; leaving the 
majority of black people still marginalised. Therefore, the privileged members of this 
elite black middle class were corporate entrepreneurs who had close links to the 
ruling party. Some of those who benefitted the most from these BEE deals, like 
Tokyo Sexwale52 and Cyril Ramaphosa53, currently hold senior official status within 
the civil service under Zuma’s presidency. Those who benefitted like these 
businessmen would fall into the upper tier of the black middle class, but middle class 
nonetheless.  
  A fundamental difference between the affirmative action policies implemented 
by the UMNO in Malaysia and the ANC in South Africa was that UMNO created 
specialised enterprises to address the Malay dilemma whereas black economic 
empowerment was centred around giving Blacks portions of white businesses that 
had existed prior to democracy being instated (Mandla, 2006:44). This then allowed 
a small number of black entrepreneurial individuals to take advantage of BEE 
policies, and pursue their own respective interests54. The latter point links to the 
trend of crony capitalism manifesting itself in the process of black empowerment, 
which was evident in the ‘Ali-baba’ arrangements in Malaysia. In Malaysia, rentierism 
was rife where Malays who had influence utilised government incentive schemes in 
order to benefit themselves and their families (Mandla, 2006:79). Therefore, with 
                                                          
52
 Sexwale is a former Minister of Human Settlements in South Africa, a businessman, former political prisoner 
under apartheid, and a politician. 
53
 Ramaphosa is currently the Deputy President of the ANC, a businessman, politician and trade union leader. 
54
 One must keep in mind that these individuals already had existing ties with the ruling party which galvanised 
their already privileged position. 
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dealings of this nature swept under the carpet, wealth ‘trickling down’ to the masses 
would always be a far-fetched hope. 
1995 saw the formation of the Black Business Council (BCC) which was 
established as an organisation that would collectively represent black business and 
ensure that BEE policies were carried out effectively. This council later became the 
foundation on which the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEECom) was 
formed under  (later in 1998) the tutelage of Cyril Ramaphosa, which would bolster 
and promote black business to challenge white capital in its dominance of the 
economy (Tangri & Southall, 2008:703). The power of this organisation, was 
primarily the fact that the BCC would force big business to adopt the BEE 
regulations55. Overall, the first and second periods of BEE failed on many fronts56, 
but mainly in  that it never achieved the trickle-down effect as intended and only 
benefitted the Sexwale’s, Motspepe’s, Ramaphosa’s and others inside the ANC.  
  
                                                          
55
 These regulations stipulated provisions premised on employment equity (especially within managerial 
positions), as well as the statutory interventions demanding the transferring of ownership to black 
entrepreneurs (Mandla, 2006:45). 
56
 There was not a sustainable increase in black ownership of South African businesses, compared to the 
successes achieved by the UMNO through the NEP in Malaysia.  
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4.4.1.2 Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEECom): Transition 
to BBBEE 
 
The BEECom was formed as a result of the failure of the BEE deals to achieve the 
‘trickling down effect’ (as well as political pressure pushing for this commission), 
whereby wealth was not transferred to benefit the majority of the country’s citizenry. 
There was also a fear that the 1969 Malaysian riots could be duplicated in a South 
African context, where Blacks would revolt against white economic domination in the 
same manner that the bumiputeras did against the ethnic Chinese minority (Mandla, 
2006:52). This failure was not only viewed in its successes in a domestic context, but 
also juxtaposed to the successes of the UMNO who managed to transfer equity from 
37% of the ethnic Chinese (who were economically dominant), to the Malays who 
made up 50% of Malaysia’s population (Daniel, Southall & Lutchman, 2005:30).  
The BEECom was established so that a clear vision and strategy could be 
formulated in terms of making economic empowerment work, and the commission’s 
mandate was to “redefine the concept of empowerment, investigate the state of 
empowerment [in South Africa], identify the hurdles to empowerment and 
recommend policy to government” (Mandla, 2006:49). The BEECom was 
ideologically premised on a rationale for broad-based empowerment, and boasted 
the formation of a national procurement agency, an investment for growth 
consensus, and the ability to appropriate public sector pension funds (Butler, n.d.: 6). 
The Commission also set out goals and objectives like those set by the UMNO 
government, namely that 30% of productive land had to be owned by Blacks in 
South Africa, that 50% of financial loans appearing on the books of national 
development institutions should be black-owned firms, as well as at least 40% of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
directors of JSE listed companies should be black (Mandla, 2006:50). The next 
section will deal with the third wave of BEE in South Africa, and uncover the extent to 
which his initiative was successful in growing the black middle class. 
4.4.1.3 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: The Third Wave 
 
The Broad-Based Black Empowerment Strategy, devised in 2003 under Mbeki’s 
ANC, sought to equitably redress levels of ownership and participation of the 
majority in South Africa’s formal economy.  One must keep in mind that the GEAR 
macroeconomic policy prioritised growth before redistribution57 (Tangri & Southall, 
2008:703). The ANC knew they were under pressure to be accountable to their 
broad-based constituency (which ensured their political dominance); hence the 
policy instruments introduced. These policy instruments could then be used to flex its 
muscles to achieve BEE that would benefit the broader citizenry, and not only 
politically connected black elites. These policy instruments were embodied in a 
generic scorecard put forth by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which 
included “preferential procurement, legislation, institutional support, financial and 
other incentive schemes” (Mandla, 2006:53). On the DTI website, the generic 
scorecard used by government has a further seven scorecard elements whereby 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government departments as well as private 
companies are measured in terms of how well they comply to achieve the targets of 
BEE (http://bee.b1sa.co.za/GENERICSIM.htm). The generic scorecard reflects the 
influence of the NDR ideology, because SOEs, state institutions and private 
companies were expected to reflect demographic representativeness on all levels. 
As the table below illustrates, the scorecard measures compliance in terms of 
                                                          
57
 The ANC elites had realised that a growth strategy was not adequate enough in terms of addressing the 
economic inequalities prevalent in post-1994 South Africa, as a result of colonisation and apartheid. 
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Ownership, Management, Employment Equity, Skills Development, Procurement, 
Enterprise Development and Socio-Economic Development. 
Table 4:BBBEE Generic Scorecard 
Element 
Weighting 
% 
Indicators of each Element, whereby the 
total Element is measured. 
Ownership 20 
-Voting rights for Blacks and Women 
-Economic Interest for black and Women 
-Current net ownership 
Management 10 
-Black representation at top level 
management 
-Black Women representation at top level 
management 
Employment Equity 10 
-Black Management as a % of all 
management and the same for black women 
Skills Development 20 -Skills spend on black employees 
Procurement 20 -Total BBBEE spend 
Enterprise 
Development 
10 
-Average annual enterprise development 
spend 
Socio-Economic 
Development 
10 
-Average annual socio-economic 
development spend 
Total: 100  
 
Source: adapted from the DTI Website 2013 (http://bee.b1sa.co.za/QSESIM.htm)  
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Using the above scorecard, the DTI awards economic entities a BBBEE status 
according the respective points they accumulate within every element category58.  
However, there has been much criticism against the BBBEE scorecard with 
reference to its feasibility in achieving set goals, the costs involved in implementing 
the framework, and the role of a more empowered state in intervening in the 
economy and implications thereof (Butler, n.d.:7). These criticisms are hinged on 
factors like white businesses being able to come off as being pro-BEE and abiding 
by the rules in order to achieve said targets, by manipulating the scorecard itself in 
terms of doing well in certain elements to make up for poor performance in others59. 
Furthermore, a fundamental pitfall of broad-based BEE is the fact that small and 
medium enterprises (SMMEs) (core of black business) are not included in the overall 
strategy, and the focus is on big companies listed on the JSE. Nowhere in the 
framework of the BBBEE scorecard is provision made for SMMEs. Additionally, 
compared to the Malaysian NEP which was attentive to issues of job creation, 
reducing poverty and inequality, as well as land reform, the broad-based BEE 
strategy separated these aspects and primarily focused on issues of increasing 
participation and the stakes of Blacks in South Africa’s economy (Mandla, 2006:61). 
This latter point was a fundamental flaw in the ANC’s approach to implementing 
BEE, since the majority of black people did not benefit from the first two phases of 
BEE implementation because they could not afford shares or did not possess the 
necessary skills which provided access to certain professions in business. This then 
left the poor further marginalised. In order for BEE to be successful as a policy 
framework, the alleviation of poverty needs to be more readily addressed so that the 
                                                          
58
 Each of the elements are explained by certain codes of good practice, and once these are gazetted the codes 
are binding on all state departments (Butler, 7).  
59
 For instance, a company can afford not to have black ownership (black shareholders), but can make up for 
this pitfall in elements like skills development which have less of an impact (Mandla, 2006:56). 
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majority of previously disadvantaged blacks can move into higher-earning class 
categories60. The next section will focus on the NDR and the composition of the 
South African bureaucracy, which yielded greater successes in growing the black 
middle class, compared to cadre deployment in business. 
4.5 The NDR and the South African Bureaucracy 
4.5.1 Cadre Deployment Strategy within State Institutions 
 
The previous section of this chapter discussed Black Economic Empowerment as a 
means to an end of achieving transformation in the economy, and hence ties in quite 
well with the overarching ANC project of transformation known as the NDR. BEE can 
be largely viewed as the ANC implementing the NDR in terms of state intervention in 
the economy and in businesses, in order to achieve the objective of making South 
Africa a more inclusive, and equitable polity. This section of this chapter is focused 
on the implementation of the NDR ideology within state institutions, which has been 
the prevailing factor for the advancement of Blacks into middle class white collar 
occupations post-1994. Therefore, it is important for one to highlight the ANC’s NDR 
approach through the ruling party’s Cadre Development and Deployment Strategy 
(De Jager, 2009:282). According to Heywood (2002:249), a cadre is a political party 
member, who has been educated and disciplined in line with the ideology of that 
respective party, and it is then expected to show utmost loyalty to the party’s 
doctrinal discipline and objectives. This aforementioned strategy of Cadre 
development and deployment was officially approved by the ruling party at its 50th 
National Conference in 1997 (De Jager, 2009:283). This strategy is essential to the 
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 The alleviation of South Africa’s vast poverty and inequality will require BEE being broadened to a wider 
constituency. 
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aims of the NDR, because it allows the ANC to appoint loyal ANC party members to 
strategic positions as civil servants within the state machinery. Furthermore, it also 
allows the ANC to infiltrate not only specific jobs in the public service, but also 
independent state institutions like the judiciary.  This means that the ruling 
(dominant) party fills up the bureaucracy with party members who are mandated to 
uphold their loyalty to the ANC, over and above the institution by which they are 
employed.  This latter point is emphasised by former president Mbeki’s words to a 
Lekgotla61 in 2008:  
Everybody in this room is ANC and all deployed in government by us are 
ANC. The mandate is not government’s mandate but that of the ANC. We 
have a common responsibility to ensure that the ANC continues to enjoy the 
support and respect that it has enjoyed in the past. (De Jager, 2009:283) 
The abovementioned quote is clearly indicative of the ruling party’s aim to 
consolidate   the NDR as a hegemonic concept throughout the different spheres of 
government so that it becomes hegemonic within society as well. According to 
Rivero, Du Toit & Kotze (2003:6), the black middle class nearly doubled its size from 
1994 to the year 2000. However, the previous section of this chapter has 
emphasised that affirmative action policies like BEE implemented in business, only 
yielded small successes in terms of growing the upper black middle class. The real 
growth of the black middle class after 1994 was achieved through cadre deployment 
employment equity within the state’s bureaucracy. As stated in the introduction of 
this chapter, the bureaucracy that the ANC had inherited was vast, ineffective and 
expensive to maintain. Therefore the bureaucracy had to be reduced in its size, and 
the plethora of public administrations had to be integrated into one public service 
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 This term means a meeting place for villages, court cases or business/conference meeting. 
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(Chipkin, 2011:41). The table below will illustrate the composition of the bureaucracy 
by race before 1994 and in 2003:  
Table 5: Composition of Bureaucracy by Race, 1993 and 2003 (%) 
 
National 
(1993) 
National 
(2003) 
Provinces 
(2003) 
Black 41.3% 62.8% 78.6% 
Indian 3.97% 5.4% 30% 
Coloured 16.25% 29.6% 9.1% 
White 38.5% 23.6% 9.34% 
Source: Adapted from Southall (2004a:12). 
When one looks at the table above it become very evident that Blacks and 
Coloureds have benefitted the most from the ANC government’s restructuring of the 
state bureaucracy. This has been enabled primarily through policies of affirmative 
action, employment equity as well as the ANC’s strategy of cadre deployment of 
party members. Additionally, according to the South African Institute for Race 
Relations (2012), public service employment has grown by 22% from 2001 to 2011, 
from 1.1 million employees to 1.3 million. However, over the same period of time, 
total employment has only grown by 5%. Of the 1.3 million government employees, 
“450 000 works as teachers, nurses and doctors (professionals), about 190 000 are 
employed by the South African Police Service, about 250 000  in local governments, 
and several hundreds of thousands are employed in public institutions like 
parastatals and Section Nine institutions (South African Institute for Race Relations, 
2012). The table below illustrates selected middle class occupations by race, which 
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reinforces previously mentioned statistics concerning demographic restructuring in 
the civil service: 
Table 6: Selected Employment by Occupation, Race and Sector 2012 (%) 
Occupation Black Coloured Indian White Total 
Professional, semi-professional, 
Legislators & senior officials 
42.4% 11.2% 8.7% 37.7% 100% 
Managerial, executive and 
Administrative 
35.5% 11.5% 8.5% 44.5% 100% 
Clerks 56.8% 15.5% 6.1% 21.7% 100% 
Technician 57.1% 11.9% 5.3% 25.9% 100% 
 
Source: Adapted from the South African Institute for Race Relations (South Africa 
Survey), 2012:237. (http://www.sairr.org.za/services/publications/south-africa-
survey/south-africa-survey-2012/downloads/pp215-284.Employ.05Dec12.pdf)  
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Table 7: Employment in SOEs and public institutions according to race 2011 
(%) 
Dept. Enterprises Black Coloured Indian White 
Dept. of Communications 64.3% 12.3% 4.9% 18.4% 
Dept. of Defence & Military Veterans 31.1% 24.4% 3.7% 40.8% 
Dept. of Home Affairs 71.7% 8.8% 1.9% 17.6% 
Dept. of Labour 72.7% 7.2% 5.2% 14.9% 
Dept. of Public Enterprises 61.2% 9.2% 3.9% 25.7% 
Dept. of Science & Technology 49.7% 10% 6% 34.3% 
Dept. of Sport 48.7% 27.7% 6.7% 16.8% 
Dept. of Tourism 46.4% 9.3% 11.9% 32.5% 
Dept. of Trade & Industry 70.1% 6.4% 4.2% 19.3% 
Dept. of Transport 72.5% 10.8% 3.4% 13.4% 
National Treasury 55.2% 9.7% 6% 29% 
The Presidency 85.6% 8.5% 2.7% 3.2% 
Total: 62.2% 9.9% 4.3% 23.7% 
 
Source: Adapted from the South African Institute for Race Relations (South Africa 
Survey), 2012:252. (http://www.sairr.org.za/services/publications/south-africa-
survey/south-africa-survey-2012/downloads/pp215-284.Employ.05Dec12.pdf)  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
It is important to highlight that those cadres deployed by the ruling party, or through 
affirmative action and employment equity policies, must serve two masters, which 
fosters a clash of interests. For instance, the public service is there to serve and be 
accountable to the citizens of South Africa and not to the ANC: private institutions 
are there to serve the interests of private shareholders and not the ruling party’s, and 
lastly academia is an arena which should foster critical independent debate around 
the status quo, and should not be a vehicle for the ANC to entrench its political 
ideology (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013). Therefore, when one looks at the black middle 
class, it becomes evident that this very class is born out of the ANC’s NDR strategy 
instruments like cadre deployment, employment equity and affirmative action policies. 
The ANC looks to legitimise itself by creating a developmental state that is 
buttressed by the emergent black middle class. This forms part and parcel of the 
ruling party’s obsession with infiltrating business, state institutions, civil society and 
the intellectual community with their ideology of the NDR. The ANC’s strategy and 
command in terms of appointing its cadres within all spheres as mentioned above, 
becomes a “means of patronage” and gateway to co-opt the middle class to the 
ideology and needs of the ANC (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013). The following section 
will look at the NDR and the intellectual community. 
4.6 The NDR and Academia 
 
4.6.1 Role of Education in redressing past injustices 
 
As stipulated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the middle class is largely recognised as 
being the most pro-democratic stratum within society. But this notion is related to the 
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state of modernisation within a polity; because with economic development comes 
greater economic security and more importantly, widespread higher education 
(Lipset, 1963:45). The latter is fundamental to the middle class in democratised 
countries, because with higher education comes the opportunity to secure higher-
earning occupations, and hence a stable platform for voicing their political opinions 
and possibly seeing them replicated in government policy. However, the Malay and 
black populations in the respective countries were oppressed and were not afforded 
adequate education 62  that would allow them to participate in the mainstream 
economy; this in turn resulted in the severe socio-economic inequalities prevalent in 
South Africa today. However, the South African case study differs from what 
happened in Malaysia under the NEP, because education formed an integral part of 
the NEP policy in terms of addressing the Malay dilemma. In South Africa, although 
a lot of emphasis is placed on education with the aim of achieving an inclusive 
education system, guided by development agenda and by means of the NDR, the 
BEE strategy implemented by the ANC government excludes education (Mandla, 
2006:67). Instead, it is up to the Department of Education to address the issue of 
education and the higher education system, independently from the BEE objectives. 
With this being said, the ANC government has tackled the task of fostering a 
more equitable education system that it inclusive of previously disadvantaged groups 
and Blacks especially. The state planned to widen access to higher education for all 
ethnic groupings amongst the populace, and increase participation63 from 15% to 
20% within a period of 10 to 15 years (Mandla, 2006:65). For instance, the National 
Commission on Higher Education set up the government-funded National Student 
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 The Bantu Education Act of 1953 and the Education Policy Act of 1967 organized the education system to 
benefit the white population under the apartheid regime (Mandla, 2006:64).  
63
 This participation refers to the number of students entering tertiary education after finishing high school. 
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Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) which would grant students in public higher 
education institutions grants and funding to further their tertiary education (Mandla, 
2006:65). In the year 2009, R2.5 billion was awarded in bursaries and loans to 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds (benefiting over 140 000 students), and 
these study loans were granted on the notion that they would be recovered through 
the tax system once these students had graduated and found employment. 
(http://www.ieasa.studysa.org/resources/Study_SA/Facts_Figures_section.pdf). One 
must keep in mind that these study bursaries and loans were significantly in line with 
the special privileges64 enjoyed by the Malays in terms of access to higher education 
under the NEP. For instance, the ethnic quotas set at public universities in Malaysia 
were 55% Malay, 30% Chinese and 10% Indian (Ong, 2012:7).  In South Africa, 
numbers of black students in higher education institutions have increased from 32% 
in 1990 to 61% in 2005, compared to the number of Whites, which has shrunk to 
25%. The ANC has also looked to infiltrate universities (or at least historically black 
universities) with the NDR on a management level.  For instance, according to 
Giliomee & Simkins (1998) “ANC politicians intervened to dissuade the University of 
Durban Westville from appointing a former president of AZAPO 65  as its vice-
chancellor.” However, the government’s yardstick of 25% of students graduating 
each year has not been met since only around 15% achieve this. Reiterating the 
latter, The South African Institute for Race Relations stated that: 
In 1991, the number of degrees awarded to white students outnumbered the 
number awarded to African students by 3.7 to 1. Data for 2011 shows that this 
ratio has reversed. Not only does the number of African degrees awarded 
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 Malays were afforded to go to university on full scholarships sponsored by the state, irrespective of the 
background which they came from. 
65
 Azanian People’s Organisation. 
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outnumber white by a ratio of 1.7 to 1, but more Africans than whites receive 
degrees in almost every discipline, including engineering, law, health 
sciences, social sciences and maths (Holborn, 2013:3). 
Although things have been gradually changing throughout the years, a major 
problem in the education system lies in the fact that there is a great shortage of black 
students in the fields of Science, Engineering and Technology (SET) as well as 
Business and Commerce66 (Mandla, 2006:66). This is problematic because these 
fields of study are critical to South Africa’s developmental objectives67, hence the 
need for an even distribution of ethnically diverse students across all fields of study, 
which in turn will aid in addressing the injustices of the past. The latter point is in line 
with Lipset’s literature outlined in Chapter 2, where it is stated that subordinate 
classes will only be afforded the chance to move up the social rankings through 
education68, which fosters higher-earning income occupational opportunities. The 
following section of this chapter will look the extent to which the ANC’s ideology of 
the NDR achieved through policy mechanisms like BEE, affirmative action, cadre 
deployment and employment equity, has grown and shaped a black middle class 
that is not only sympathetic to ruling party’s cause, but loyal to it as well.      
4.7 The ANC’s ‘Black Middle Class’  
 
As stipulated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the black middle class will be 
conceptualised according to occupation; therefore those categorised as  middle 
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 Most students of colour (and Blacks especially) are in the fields of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, as 
well as Education. 
67
 The South African economy needs skilled and educated youth within the field of business, science and 
technology. 
68
 The improvement of the education system across all levels, is the only viable approach to eradicating 
poverty in societies that have vast income inequalities. 
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class will be non-manual employees like professionals, managers, civil servants and 
entrepreneurs69. The reason for conceptualising the black middle class according to 
occupation is that it is more relevant and applicable not only because of the severe 
poverty and inequality inherited from South Africa’s turbulent past 70 , but more 
importantly also because this approach could bear fruit in terms of highlighting how 
the middle class grew, and the implications thereof. Since the ANC came into power 
in 1994 heading a new democratic dispensation, the black middle class has grown 
considerably   (Rivero, Du Toit and Kotze (2003:17), from representing 3.3% to 
representing 7.85% of the black population, which is the largest proportional growth 
compared to other ethnicities like White, Coloured and Indian. These findings are in 
line with statistics provided by the South African Institute for Race Relations, stating 
that 42.4% of the black middle class are employed as professionals and state 
officials, 35.5% employed as managers and executives, 56.8% as clerks and 57.1% 
employed in technical services. Furthermore, according to Southall (2004a:12) 62.8% 
of South Africa’s National bureaucracy was black in the year 2003.  
Therefore, the plausible inference that can be made with the evidence at hand 
is that the ANC through NDR (achieved via previously mentioned policy mechanisms) 
has grown its own ‘organic’ black middle class. This has been achieved by the ruling 
party strengthening its hold on state power (centralising power and decision-making), 
which has allowed the ANC to penetrate all spheres of government and society to 
replicate demographic representativeness. Additionally, I assert that in the context of 
                                                          
69
 The professionals grouping consists of lawyers, doctors, teachers, nurses, accountants and architects etc. 
The managers refer to employees who work as administrators in trade and finance. Lastly, the entrepreneurs 
are regarded as the business group who own the means of production as employers (Rivero, Du Toit & Kotze, 
2003:12). 
70
 Other more orthodox conceptualisations of middle class premised on the middle-income distribution/ 
middle strata or according to affluence, are more applicable in more mature democracies of the developed 
world, and neglect specific contextual factors of the peripheral world like the role of history, the political 
system and the way politics is conducted.  
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a one-party dominant political system, ethnic politics and the manner in which the 
state bureaucracy is configured in; a ‘state sponsored’ middle class retards the 
democratic role/impact of the said middle class, as conventionally assumed in 
modernisation theory. The middle class, which is said to be more educated and able 
to secure better income security, “have more time and money to protest against 
[undemocratic practices] than dollar-a-day labourers71” (The Economist, 2013:56). 
The middle class is also more skilled in terms of findings means of redress through 
the system of courts and complaints. Additionally, although the ANC is dominant in 
the legislature as the vanguard of the black majority in South Africa, the ruling party 
could still be confronted by organised interests within civil society looking to exert 
their influence on decision-making (Giliomee & Simkins, 1998). However, because 
the NDR ideology penetrates all levels of government and society, the ANC’s 
dominance is buttressed by the various interest groups72 in civil society that it has 
co-opted into an ‘alliance’, including the black middle class. The black middle class 
enjoys their privileged social status, unlike  the black majority living in dire poverty, 
as a result of ANC policies which underwrites their loyalty to the ruling party. One 
could argue that party discipline and ‘toeing the party line ’ has seeped into certain 
areas of society co-opted by the ANC, since the ANC controls party members, public 
services, the statutory body and parastatal appointments (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013). 
Therefore, on the issue of accountability to the broader citizenry of South Africa, 
loyalty and accountability “runs to the party and not to the public or constitutional 
arrangements” (De Jager & Du Toit, 2013). This is due to the fact that cadres need 
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 These labourers refer to the working class in and outside the formal economy. 
72
 These interest groups are COSATU, business, public service, non-governmental organisations and the 
intellectual community. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
 
to protect their current positions and future appointments; thus fostering a compliant 
middle class not willing to oppose the ANC.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight and dissect the South African political 
system as well as examine the key role-players therein, in order to broadly illustrate 
where South Africa has come from and where it is now. The transition to democracy 
was unique in South Africa’s case with reference to the liberation struggle, and 
important period-specific changes within the global order. However, it was necessary 
to map the growth of the South African democracy because of the implications it had 
for the political system that manifested, as well as understanding the ideology and 
behaviour of the ruling party. Because the ANC is a liberation movement turned 
political party, the party views itself as the vanguard of the people through the 
ideology of the NDR, so that the ANC’s liberation credentials form a major driving 
force in the party, firmly entrenching its political dominance. Additionally, because of 
South Africa’s racial history, politics is aligned along ethnic lines which further 
reinforces the ANC’s political dominance throughout the polity.  
However, although the first decade of democracy in both South Africa and 
Malaysia (more so the former compared to the latter) did little to transform the 
economic imbalances of their respective pasts, both dominant political parties 
managed to achieve success in nurturing an ethnic middle class (through their 
respective policies) that is loyal and disciplined in the party’s political ideologies. The 
chapter has also illustrated  the flaw in modernisation theory, when it is applied to 
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contexts where there is a dominant party political system, ethnic politics and a 
bureaucracy submissive to the ruling party. These aforementioned indicators used in 
this study’s theoretical framework, are fundamental in endorsing the statement that a 
state- sponsored middle class does not necessarily lead to a stronger democracy. 
The following chapter will discuss the similarities and differences of how the UMNO 
and the ANC managed to transform their respective economic landscapes through 
policy. But more importantly, the concluding chapter will highlight the massive impact 
dominant political party systems, ethnic politics, and the composition of a 
bureaucracy has on the democratic role of the middle class in these states. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The starting point that prompted this study was the notion that a large middle class 
has a tendency of producing stronger democratic outcomes or a stronger democratic 
order. However, as illustrated by the Malaysian and South African cases in Chapters 
3 and 4, this conventional assumption does not necessarily hold true in all 
democracies. There are fundamental contextual factors that are overlooked by the 
aforementioned notion, which have come to attention because of complex 
democracies like South Africa and Malaysia. The purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight and reiterate the key findings of this thesis, with reference to the doubtful 
eventuality that state-sponsored ethnic middle classes are likely to abandon the 
ruling parties that helped create them. The following sections will reiterate the three 
key factors used to compare South Africa and Malaysia; namely one-party 
dominance, ethnic politics and the composition of the bureaucracy. 
5.2 One-Party Dominance & Ethnic Politics 
 
The colonial and apartheid histories of South Africa and Malaysia are central 
starting-points if one is to understand the nature of politics in these respective 
countries, because their histories have an enormous impact not only on the party 
system that manifested after independence and the inauguration of democracy, but 
also on the elite and wider citizenry collectively. For example, the Malaysian case 
illustrated that British immigration policies (under colonial rule) impacted on the polity 
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by cementing an ethnic division of labour amongst Malays, Chinese and Indians. The 
majority of indigenous Malays were relegated to the lowest societal structure as rural 
agricultural peasants, while some were recruited into the institutional structures of 
the state to secure Malay political primacy (Ahmad, 1989:347). On the other hand, 
the Chinese were grounded in commerce and the Indians more so in the plantations, 
which reinforced ethnic divisions across the board. The British practice of 
encouraging the immigration of Chinese and Indians into Malaysia during the 
colonial period, converted the country into an ethnically heterogeneous society 
where ethnic divisions are premised on political power, economic resources and 
cultural and religious existence (Haque, 2003:244). In addition, although 
consociationalism was practised after independence by The Alliance government, 
Malaysia’s ethnic division and contestation cannot be divorced from the legacy of 
colonial rule and resulted in Malaysia being categorised as an ‘ethnic democracy’ 
(Haque, 2003:242).  
The UMNO rose to the fore as the protector of the Malay interests on the 
political front, and institutionalised special Malay rights which were protected by the 
constitution. These special rights heavily influenced the way political parties were 
organised, the policy agenda of government, and the electoral voting direction. In 
sum, the contestation of special Malay rights  would manifest in the 1969 ethnic riots 
and the suspension of democracy, the dominance of the UMNO within the BN two 
years later, and the shape state policies like the NEP took on  to address the Malay 
dilemma (Jamil, 2010:4). The structure of the BN itself reinforced ethnic cleavages 
where different political parties represented their respective ethnicities; hence 
galvanising the idea that only racially based political organisations can represent 
different racial interests adequately in Malaysia. With this being the state of affairs 
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and because democracy is based on majority rule, the UMNO’s political longevity 
was secured since around 65% of the population are Malays (Haque, 2003:243). 
The UMNO historically the “protector of Malay interests” within the BN 
structure formulated and implemented public policies that were beneficial to their 
Malay constituencies which strengthened their party support base, but also were 
fundamental to the growth of the Malay middle class during the period of the NEP. In 
order to address the issue of the Malay dilemma, the policies implemented meant 
that Malays would be systematically protected by affirmative action policies in 
education, business and in public service employment.  
 Similar to Malaysia, South Africa was also colonised by the British but the 
black population (as well as Coloureds and Indians)73 were systematically oppressed 
and marginalised under the apartheid regime. Apartheid can be encapsulated as 
blatant racial authoritarianism over subordinate races, which has had a significant 
influence on ethnic politics in South Africa. For example, apartheid laws restricted 
oppressed ethnicities to the lowest societal structures, similar to the Malays’ position 
in Malaysia. Like the UMNO, the ANC (the oldest liberation movement in South 
Africa) gained its significance amongst the previously oppressed citizenry because of 
the party’s liberation credentials, and is viewed as the protector of their interests. 
South Africa’s racial legacy left the ANC with high levels of poverty and severe 
economic inequalities amongst respective races and classes (De Jager & Du Toit, 
2013:151). 
 Given this climate of ethnic tension amongst South Africans, this would have 
a knock-on effect of the party system that would arise. Therefore, when the ANC 
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 This thesis deals with the Black middle class in South Africa primarily, but that does not take away the fact 
that other ethnicities were also oppressed during apartheid. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
took political office in 1994, there was an expectation that the liberation movement 
turned political party needed to produce economic transformation amongst the 
previously oppressed that matched the ANC’s assumption to power (Giliomee, 
1998:6). This inspired the ANC state ideology of the NDR which is a project of 
capturing the state, in order to transform the machinery of the state in order to 
achieve social change. The NDR ideology would influence the affirmative action 
policies implemented by the ruling party in the core spheres of society like business, 
education and public service employment. 
 One needs to keep in mind that the colonial and racial histories of South 
Africa and Malaysia brought about highly polarised electorates, which have been a 
significant factor in these dominant parties commanding electoral control in their 
respective countries. This polarisation of the electorate along ethnic lines has been 
further compounded by the fact that the ruling parties passed and implemented 
affirmative action policies that would benefit the ethnic majorities. These affirmative 
action policies can be viewed as the state sponsoring the growth of specific ethnic 
middle classes, which in turn would influence the manner in which those ethnic 
middle classes would behave toward the ruling parties. The following section will 
reiterate how the affirmative action state policies influenced the growth of the 
respective ethnic middle classes in South Africa and Malaysia. 
5.3 Affirmative action in Business, Public Sector Employment and 
Education 
 
As conceptualised in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the middle class is referred to in 
occupational measures in this study. Therefore, affirmative action policies 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
implemented in key societal spheres like private business, public sector employment 
and education is fundamental to social upward mobility. The middle class is 
traditionally seen to be the pro-democratic stratum within society because they have 
higher levels of education, stable and secure income from higher-earning positions 
than the lower classes; and hence would want their ideas and opinions of an 
accountable government and good governance replicated in public policy. However, 
because the dominant political parties in control of the state (have centralised power), 
these parties have implemented the policies that have grown the ethnic middle 
classes. One can assume that the role of the dominant parties in implementing these 
policies has consciously shaped the middle classes they produced.  
 Both South Africa’s and Malaysia’s bureaucracy are dominated by Blacks and 
Malays respectively in terms of those who occupy positions in the public service. 
This phenomenon has been achieved by certain policy mechanisms like employment 
equity and ethnic quotas (or ratios) which underwrite preferential recruitment into the 
public service (Lim, 2007:1507). In South Africa, the ANC’s NDR ideology advocates 
cadre deployment into public institutions, which means that public officials deployed 
by the ruling party have an obligation to ensure ANC hegemony throughout the polity 
as a priority, and the government mandate becomes a secondary concern (De Jager, 
2009:283). The real growth of the Malay and Black middle classes is due to public 
sector expansion, in order to create jobs for the previously marginalised. This 
resulted in the state in Malaysia and in South Africa being both an initiator and 
guarantor of employment to the majority of Black and Malay middle classes. In the 
same breath, one can infer that the public service in South Africa and Malaysia are 
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politicised, where the ruling parties have embedded themselves as ‘protectors’74 
increasing their scope for patronage.  
Affirmative action was also replicated in the sphere of education and in 
academia since these are key avenues for social upward mobility. Preferential policy 
in education is fundamental because a higher level of education tends to secure a 
high- earning occupation. This motivated the expansion of admission quotas and the 
lowering of admission requirements, making available scholarships, as well as 
creating institutions for the professional training of ethnic middle class graduates 
(Haque, 2005:249). Furthermore, government provided study grants and funding to 
students from previously disadvantaged backgrounds for tertiary education, which 
would later be recovered via the tax system once these students graduated and 
found employment75. In Malaysia, these preferential policies were extended as far as 
granting scholarships and educational grants to “nearly every Malay, rich or poor” 
(Van der Westhuizen, 2002:29). Additionally, Malay was also made the sole official 
language which in turn impacted on public sector employment, because proficiency 
in Malay was a requirement (Jamil, 2010:10). Therefore, it is clear that affirmative 
action policies in education have had an important impact in the growth of the Malay 
(and Black) middle classes. 
 Similar to the special privileges for Malays set out under the NEP economic 
policy by the UMNO, the ANC’s BEE affirmative action policy and initiatives were 
also widely regarded as important to the ruling party in terms of addressing the 
past’s economic disempowerment of the past. The NEP looked to achieve a target of 
30% of Malay ownership and participation in industrial and commercial sectors by 
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 As mentioned already, the UMNO and the ANC are seen as the protectors of the Black and Malay interests. 
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 http://www.ieasa.studysa.org/resources/Study_SA/Facts_Figures_section.pdf 
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1990. This was to be achieved through the growth of SOEs and the state acquisition 
of private economic corporations that would create opportunities for the Malay 
middle class to emerge (Embong, 1996:540). For example, government departments 
would reserve contracts for Malay firms; this ‘tendering-out’ of government contracts 
is also evident in South Africa under BEE. In South Africa under the first and second 
periods of BEE implementation, white-owned corporations simply granted equity or 
shares to BEE groups or conglomerates on the assumption that this wealth would 
trickle down to the masses. However, this only benefitted a select few of BEE 
businessmen who were closely connected to the ANC. Similarly, the political culture 
of patronage is evident in Malaysia where there are close links between heads of 
companies and political elites hailing from the UMNO (Verma, 2002:71). The latter 
point illustrates the alliance between the state and private business. The 
fundamental difference between the UMNO’s NEP and the ANC’s BEE, was that in 
Malaysia specialised enterprises were created to address the Malay dilemma 
whereas in South Africa the focus was on giving Blacks portions of ‘White’ 
companies that had existed prior to democracy.  The third period of BBBEE aimed to 
improve the implementation of economic empowerment and the trickling down effect. 
BBBEE was also heavily influenced by the NDR with reference to achieving 
demographic representativeness within SOEs, state institutions and private 
companies. However, even though the generic scorecard was introduced to force 
companies across the board to abide by set regulations, there were loopholes in the 
system that could be bypassed (Mandla, 2006:61).  
 In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to show that the ethnic middle classes 
that emerged as a result of the dominant party’s state policies must be considered to 
have been consciously shaped by those political parties. The UMNO and ANC-led 
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states managed to centralise power within their polities, in order to penetrate 
fundamental spheres of society to replicate demographic representativeness via 
policy. Their ability to achieve this goal was made easier by the fact that they are 
both dominant political parties in Malaysia and South Africa where politics is aligned 
along ethnic lines. The racial histories in South Africa and Malaysia underwrite the 
fact that the citizenry (and especially the majority race group), vote along ethnic lines. 
However, it must be mentioned that this thesis is not stating that the Malay and Black 
middle classes do not support other democratic elements like the right to free speech, 
the independence of the media, and government accountability for instance; but 
because the dominant parties are the source which grew the ethnic middle class 
through policy, those ethnic middle classes are unlikely to vote the UMNO or ANC 
out of power. This thesis has looked into affirmative action policies in education, 
business and public service employment which are essential to social upward 
mobility. But importantly, because public service employment has contributed the 
most to the growth of both the Black and Malay middle classes’; loyalty and 
accountability from these public officials runs first to the political party and thereafter 
to the citizenry or constitution. 
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